A Class of Poverty Traps: A Theory and Empirical Tests by Alan Martina
 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
 




A Class of Poverty Traps: A Theory and Empirical Tests* 
 
Alan Martina 
School of Economics 
College of Business and Economics 





Working Paper No. 482 
 










* Aaron Batten, Chris Jones and Farshid Vahid are thanked for commenting on earlier drafts of this 
paper.  I remain responsible, however, for is contents. 
 
   2
Synopsis: Comparatively low levels of health and economic institutions are 
present in certain countries and not in others.  Implications drawn from this 
observation are used to modify the Solow-Swan economic growth model.   
Conjectures are derived from the resulting model concerning what circumstances 
are likely to generate a health-only poverty trap and a health-cum-institutions 
poverty trap.  These conjectures are tested through the use of quasi-controlled 
experimental evidence and econometric tests based on cross-country data sets. 
These tests support the conjecture that this class of poverty traps exists.  Certain 
implications follow regarding the broad design of development policy.   
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1. Introduction  
The notion of the poverty trap may be defined in various ways.  Failure to make 
precise what definition is being employed, however, is likely to lead to some 
confusion.  To avoid this occurring a particular definition is employed here - a 
definition that consists of two parts.  Specifically a country that initially is non-rich, 
is defined as being trapped in poverty if: (i) its level of real gross domestic product 
per capita (GDPPC) does not grow at a rate faster, over a sustained period of time, 
than that experienced by rich countries taken as a whole and (ii) there is a detailed 
theory, which is not inconsistent with the available empirical evidence, that 
indicates that this country is faced with a set of fundamental economic constraints 
that, until they are all surmounted it will never move, over an extended period of 
time, towards becoming a rich country.   
This definition alludes to a relative measure of poverty and hence alludes to the 
concept of a relative poverty trap.  To save on space, however, throughout the 
terms ‘relative poverty’ and ‘relative poverty trap’ will be abbreviated to ‘poverty’ 
and ‘poverty trap’ respectively.  Bearing that in mind, the reason for this two-part 
definition of the poverty trap is that even if a poor country satisfies the first part this 
fact does not, of itself, provide any important insights into the deep mechanisms as 
to how the world economic system operates and, therefore, provides no deep 
insights as to what usefully could be done to assist this country extract itself from 
this trap (as defined).  Since this is the far more important matter, this discussion 
concentrates on attempting to satisfy the second component of this definition of the 
poverty trap.     4
In attempting to identify this mechanism implicitly the effort also is being made 
along the way to provide a partial explanation of why certain countries, and not 
others, find themselves faced with persistent poverty.  This endeavor is of some 
importance at least in the sense that hopefully it partially fills a lacuna in the 
relevant literature that Mookerjee (2005: 231) also has noticed.  As he observed: 
“Conspicuous by its absence [in the relevant economic literature dealing with the 
measurement of poverty and poverty-mitigation policy] is a coherent analysis of 
what causes poverty in the first place ….  The questions seem never to be posed.  
What are the mechanisms by which people get trapped in chronic long-term 
poverty?  What kinds of policies might affect the nature of dynamics in and out of 
poverty?”  The discussion presented below by implication begins to attempt to 
provide answers to these sorts of questions, albeit mainly at the level of countries, 
not households.  To do this attention concentrates only on what appear to be the 
deep determinants that trap countries in poverty.
1  (The term ‘deep determinants’ 
refers to those factors that influence the levels of the proximate determinants - 
such as the levels of physical and human capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity.) 
Perhaps the most immediate evidence, that indicates that between 1960 and 
2000 a comparatively large number of countries satisfied the first part of the 
definition of the poverty trap employed here, is the following information.  Of some 
100 non-rich countries in 1960 only seven were successful at moving into higher 
                                  
1 Certainly there are numerous subsidiary considerations that need to be taken into account as well in order 
to provide a more comprehensive explanation for persistent poverty in the world.  This matter is not 
addressed in the main text.   5
income groups by 2000.  Expressed differently, of these 100 non-rich countries 
only seven experienced some absolute convergence (in the sense of managing to 
raise their respective levels of GDPPC into higher income categories).  Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) joined the rich group 
of countries, Malaysia moved from the poor group of countries into the (contender) 
group just below the rich group, while Egypt and Botswana managed to move up 
from being very poor countries to being less poor.
2  To this list of countries is 
added the People’s Republic of China (from hereon China) and Vietnam since in 
the latter part of the 20
th century and into the 21
st century both initially-poor 
countries moved abruptly from experiencing comparatively low rates of growth of 
GDPPC to attaining well-above-average rates of economic growth over a two to 
three decade period.
3  These two countries, therefore, were on an absolute 
convergence path – or tentatively so in the instance of Vietnam – over this period. 
It still needs to be determined if at least some of the remaining ninety or so 
non-rich countries at the latter part of 20
th century were trapped in poverty due to 
being unable to surmount some yet-to-be-defined fundamental constraints.   
Expressed differently it remains to determine if there was a mechanism (or were 
mechanisms) that operated in such a way as to prevent these countries from 
experiencing comparatively high rates of sustained economic growth during this 
                                  
2 See Milanovic (2005: 78).  Mauritius, which did move into the rich group of countries, is ignored in the main 
text as it is a comparatively small nation with a population of around 1.2 million – although that for Botswana 
(about 1.5 million in 1990) is not much larger. 
3 Indeed, as is well known, over a period of thirty-seven years, from 1979 through to 2006, China attained an 
average rate of growth of GDPPC never before attained, over such a continuous period of time, by any other 
country in recorded economic history.   6
period - and consequently caused these countries to be trapped in poverty (as 
defined). 
Within this context Azariadis and Stachurski (2005: 335) observed, in their 
survey of various theories of poverty traps, that ‘[p]overty trap models tend to be 
lacking in testable quantitative implications.’  A possibly partial explanation for this 
situation is that appropriate tests need to determine if relevant non-linearities and 
discontinuities are present in economic systems.  (If they are absent the relevant 
version of the poverty trap probably does not exist.)  This observation implies that 
only limited parts of the potential data set are particularly useful for allowing 
relevant and cogent tests to be applied.  The rest of the potential data set, of itself, 
is irrelevant.  Hence appropriate limited data sets may be difficult to find, apply and 
interpret.   
Nevertheless, this theme of testing for non-linearities and discontinuities in 
relevant data sets is developed in the argument developed here.  To achieve this 
end some relevant theory is set out that, in turn, generates a range of empirically 
testable conjectures or hypotheses – hypotheses that also indicate how certain 
sub-sets of data need to be constructed and assessed, and how these various 
assessments should be compared in an overall or holistic testing of the relevant 
elements of the theory.   
The train of argument begins by setting out historical information - that 
unintentionally provides information derived from quasi-controlled experiments - 
that indicates that economic development was facilitated as a consequence of 
surmounting the fundamental constraint of attaining minimum levels of both health   7
and economic institutions respectively – not just one or the other.  The relevant 
information generated by these quasi-controlled experiments hints at what ways 
the Solow-Swan economic growth model needs to be modified in order to 
incorporate the economic influences of this fundamental constraint.  The resulting 
theoretical models sketched out indicate how the health-cum-institutions poverty 
trap or the health-only poverty trap respectively may be generated.   
Drawing, in particular, on the health-cum-institutions poverty trap model a 
number of relevant testable predictions or conjectures are generated.  The tests of 
these conjectures are provided by marshalling both carefully selected relevant 
time-series data – which essentially were generated by near quasi-controlled 
experiments - and cross-country empirical information from the latter part of the 
20
th century.  In addition, the relevant quasi-controlled experimental evidence from 
earlier time periods is included in the testing process.  This holistic assessment of 
both quasi-controlled experimental evidence and cross-country data sets to test 
relevant conjectures or hypotheses should increase the cogency or reliability of the 
empirical results derived and the conclusions reached.
4  In addition, in that part of 
the testing process that makes use of regression analysis the conscious effort is 
made to allow the data identify the regression model that best fits this data.   
Certainly the data is not manipulated in order to fit some preconceived regression 
model.   
                                  
4 The point just made in the main text also appears to have been recognized, implicitly, in the evaluation by Banerjee 
et al. (2006) of the research by the World Bank over the period 1998 – 2005.  There the point is made that that 
organization has placed too much weight on empirical results derived solely from cross-country regression 
equations.  The recommendation was also made in that evaluation that the attempt should be made to make greater 
use of controlled experimental evidence to test relevant hypotheses.  See Banerjee et al. (2006: for instance 7, 65 
and 67).   8
It seems fair to say that the empirical evidence to be presented does not 
contradict the relevant conjectures or predictions derived from the relevant theory 
that indicate that the health-cum-institutions poverty trap faces certain low-health-
low-institutions countries and that the health-only poverty trap faces countries in 
which the level of health is extremely relatively low (viz. the under-five child 
mortality rate is greater than approximately one hundred per thousand live births).
5
This conclusion has at least two broad implications.  The first is that the 
standard neo-classical Solow-Swan growth model does not apply in the 
representative country across all feasible capital/labor ratios.  It only applies within 
sub-sets of these ratios.  The second broad set of implications begins by noting 
that a poor country has to escape the health-only poverty trap first before it moves 
into a position that enables it take on the task of attempting to escape the health-
cum-institutions poverty trap.  The probable existence of these poverty traps also 
has important implications for the broad design of effective development policy.  
Since this discussion identifies what appear to be the fundamental constraints that 
prevent poor countries from experiencing sustained economic development, and 
the sequence in which these constraints become binding, it now becomes a 
delicate matter of applying appropriate policies in the required sequence, and to an 
adequate degree to ensure that these countries are moved to a position where 
they should be able to surmount these constraints and escape the relevant poverty 
trap.  
                                  
5 Easterly (2006a, b) and Kraay and Raddatz (2007) have questioned the existence of poverty traps – or at 
least the poverty traps they considered.  This is not the place to embark on a detailed discussion of these 
two papers.  All that is said here is that the respective definitions of the poverty trap they considered were 
quite different to that employed in the main text.  This and related matters are considered in Martina (2007).     9
As far as I am aware, no attempt has been made elsewhere in the related 
economic literature to set out the theory developed here, let alone provide a 
detailed empirical testing of this theory.  That said, some elements of the theory 
developed later are alluded to in the relevant literature.  This matter is expanded 
upon in a footnote.
6
In the next section is presented the relevant historical quasi-controlled 
experimental evidence and the interpretation of this evidence.  This evidence is 
applied in Section 3 in the development of a basic relevant economic growth 
model.  In Section 4 this model is interpreted and some limited cross-section and 
time-series data are applied to test some of the implications of the theory that 
indicate how a poverty trap may be generated.  A structure of a more formal test of 
the poverty trap, making use of cross-country data is set out in Section 5.  There 
are, however, a number of econometric issues associated with testing relevant 
hypotheses that make use of regression analysis.  This matter is discussed in 
Section 6.  Relevant econometric evidence is presented in Section 7.  The results 
presented in the previous sections have implications for the broad design of 
                                  
6 Some of the theories that attempt to explain the concept of the poverty trap that are thought to apply in developing 
countries are surveyed by Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), although none of the theories cited there consider the 
central issues addressed in the main text.  The same can be said of most of the papers dealing with the poverty 
trap to be found in Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff (2006).  The one partial exception in this last reference is in part of the 
literature survey provided by Azariadis (2006: 20 - 23).  There some discussion is provided, based on Chakraborty 
(2004), of how the presence of low levels of health may generate a poverty trap.  This analysis and that found in 
Galor and Mayer-Foulkes (2004), Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Chakraborty, Papageorgiou and Sebastián (2005) 
have some points in common with the argument developed in the main text in that the country concerned has to 
attain a minimum, or threshold level of health if it is to have any chance of attaining relatively rapid sustained 
economic development.  However, the discussions in these references only allow the level of health to influence a 
limited range of relevant variables (or proximate determinants).  In contrast, the argument in the main text allows 
the level of health to influence an economy along a comparatively large number of channels.  In addition, this 
argument allows for the requirement that the community also must attain some minimum level of economic 
institutions and that these institutions and health interact with one another in ways that are of economic importance.  
The references just cited make no mention of these latter, and fundamentally important, matters. 
A discussion of the poverty trap that is tangential to that provided in the main text is that by Sala-i-Martin (2005).   10
effective economic policy.  This matter is briefly discussed in section 8.   
Concluding comments are made in Section 9. 
2. Quasi-controlled experimental evidence  
One approach, in attempting to determine the likely influence of health and 
economic institutions (hereon institutions) respectively and/or in combination on 
the level of development for a representative country, is to consider what insights 
can be garnered from relevant facts that have been generated by relevant 
controlled or quasi-controlled experiments.  If such evidence is available it is likely 
to be more reliable than the information produced by uncontrolled experiments.  
This is so since in these latter experiments invariably there are problems 
associated with interpreting the data generated through employing statistical 
manipulation and inference.  Specifically, in this manipulation it is difficult to allow 
satisfactorily for factors such as reverse causation between variables, omitted 
variables and errors in the measurement of relevant variables.
7  (Some of these 
matters are considered Section 6.) 
Since the relevant limited contemporary evidence generated by controlled 
experiments has been surveyed by Miguel (2005) and Belli, Bustereo and Preker 
(2005), attention here will concentrate on just some of the evidence generated 
unintentionally by quasi-controlled experiments that occurred as a consequence of 
certain historical events.  Attention will only consider, albeit briefly, five historical 
episodes – although other relevant historical episodes could be cited.   
                                  
7 This point has been emphasized by Miguel (2005) within the context of determining the influence of health 
on education levels and work output in developing countries.    11
2.1 High quality economic institutions and changing the level of health  
  In a well-designed controlled experiment certain relevant variables have to be 
in place in the initial situation and are held constant while the variable of interest is 
altered in size during the running of the experiment.  Within the present context the 
variable that, in particular, needs to be in place and is held constant are economic 
institutions that are at a level that adequately protect individual property rights.  It 
seems reasonable to assert that this condition was satisfied throughout the 
historical episodes considered in this sub-section.   
The first historical episode is well known; namely, the relevant events that 
preceded the building of the Panama Canal.
8  Initial attempts to build this canal in 
the 1880s by the French company established by Ferdinand de Lesseps had to be 
abandoned mainly because of the high mortality rate, caused by yellow fever and 
malaria, amongst the workforce.  (At some locations along the canal corridor it is 
likely that two out of every three workers died from either of these diseases.)   
Matters changed significantly when a major medical advance was made in 
1897 by Ross in discovering that certain mosquitoes of the Anopholes genus were 
the carriers of the parasites of the Plasmodium species that caused malaria.  (That 
these parasites cause malaria was discovered by Alphonse Laveren in 1880.  The 
discovery by Ross was reaffirmed in more complete and thorough experiments in 
1898 by Grassi, Bignami and Bastianelli.)  Possibly motivated in part by this 
discovery and the experimental design devised by Grassi, members of the United 
                                  
8 The references drawn upon in the main text are McCullough (1977), Harrison (1978), Hamoudi and Sachs (1999), 
Gallup and Sachs (2001), Keiser, Singer and Utzinger (2005), Spielman and D’Antonio (2001), Hutchinson and 
Ungo (2004) and Snowden (2006).   12
States medical army corps made a similar discovery in 1900 in Cuba regarding 
yellow fever.  The vector in this instance was the mosquito Aedes aegypti.   
This new knowledge was immediately exploited by the United States 
government once it had acquired the rights to build the Panama Canal in 1904.  
Specifically it was realized by those in authority in this government that if the canal 
was to be built at a reasonable cost - including the cost in human life - yellow fever 
and malaria had to be brought under control.  For instance a friend of, and adviser 
to President Theodore Roosevelt, Dr William David Lambert – a medical doctor - 
provided the following advice to Roosevelt: ‘…If you fall back upon the old methods 
… you will fail, just as the French failed.  If … [there is a] campaign against the 
mosquito, you will get your canal.’ (McCullough (1977: 467 – 8).)   
In the attempt to bring yellow fever and malaria under control the local 
breeding environment for Aedes aegypti along the Panama Canal corridor was 
altered in order to drastically reduce the risk of this mosquito biting humans; viz. 
reduce the entomologic inoculation rate (EIR) for this mosquito.  This action 
resulted in a dramatic decline in the level of the mortality and morbidity rates 
amongst the workforce.
9   
The canal, once completed in 1914 went on to provide a range of benefits to the 
United States economy.  Based on their calculations of the net value of these benefits to 
the United States, Hutchinson and Ungo (2004) came to the conclusion that the 
investment in the Panama Canal possibly was ‘the best investment the United States 
                                  
9 Whereas the average mortality rate amongst the workforce was 33 per cent in the period 1881 through to 1888, 
over the period 1904 to 1914 only 2 per cent of the workforce was hospitalized.  The incidence of malaria fell from 
800 per thousand in 1906 to 14 per thousand in 1917.    13
government has ever made based on the social benefit relative to the cost of building it.’  
It seems safe to assert that this outcome would not have been achieved had yellow fever 
and malaria not been brought under control along the Panama Canal corridor.  This is 
despite the fact that economic institutions of an adequate level, with respect to the 
building and operation of the Panama Canal, must have been in place from the early 
1880s through to 1914 and beyond.  If these institutions had not been in place surely the 
building of this canal would not have even been contemplated?   
The new scientific knowledge regarding what factors caused and transmitted 
malaria were also quickly put to use in Malaya (now Malaysia) between 1901 and 
1920 to facilitate the economic development of this British colony – and particularly 
the economic development of the rubber plantation industry in this colony.
10  Again 
the environment needed to be altered in order to drastically reduce the EIR for 
certain genera of mosquitoes.  Before attempts were made to do so, however, in 
one of the most important coffee and rubber plantation areas in Malaya (viz. Klang) 
individuals were continuously ill and unable to work.  In addition mortality rates in 
1908 of around 300 per thousand were not uncommon amongst the workforce 
employed on plantations and engineering works.  (This rate of mortality was only a 
little less than that - 333 per thousand - experienced in the attempt to build the 
Panama Canal in the early- to mid-1880s.)  These facts suggest, therefore, that in 
the period 1901 to 1908 attempts to build a profitable plantation industry in Malaya 
were under some threat from malaria.   
                                  
10 The references drawn upon in the main text regarding this particular historical episode are Watson (1943), 
Reid and Reid (1956), Harrison (1978), Konradsen et al. (2004) and Keiser, Singer and Utzinger (2005).   14
Through luck and a series of discoveries (regarding the entomology of 
mosquitoes) Malcolm Watson and others determined in what ways the 
environment could to be altered, at comparatively low cost, in order to reduce to 
satisfactory levels the EIR for relevant varieties of the Anopholes mosquito.  Once 
reduced, the mortality rate amongst the plantation workforce fell to 33 per 
thousand by 1920.  Without this reduction it seems safe to assume that the 
economic development of Malaya would have been much impeded.  An even 
stronger view was held by Eric MacFadyen who stated, based on his experience 
as a planter in Malaya
11: ‘Had it not been for malaria control, British Malaya … 
could never have been realized. … [N]ot a tithe of [its economic development] 
could have been achieved had malaria remained uncontrolled.’
12
Broadly similar tools for the control of the populations of certain genera of the 
Anopholes mosquito (but different from those found in Malaya) again were brought 
to bear by Watson in order to allow the profitable exploitation of copper deposits in 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) in the 1930s and beyond.
13  Previous attempts at 
mining these deposits profitably in the late 1920s were threatened by the fact that 
about a third of the labor force deserted this mining venture.  This behavior was in 
response to the high risk, as perceived by the workforce, of contracting debilitating 
malaria or dying from this disease while working at the mines.  Once this perceived 
                                  
11 See MacFadyen (1953: x). 
12 Cited in Watson (1943: 343).   
13 The references exploited in the main text are Watson (1953), Utzinger, Tozam and Singer (2001), 
Utzinger, Tozan, Doumani and Singer (2002), Keiser, Singer and Utzinger (2005).  A related reference that 
provides useful insights is Killeen, Seyoum and Knols (2004).   15
risk was diminished by altering the breeding environment for certain varieties of the 
Anopholes mosquito there was little difficulty in hiring labor.
14 
15   
The availability of a relatively healthy work force assisted in allowing copper 
mining enterprises to flourish.  The costs of doing so, according to Utzinger et al. 
(2002, p.673) ‘were miniscule when compared with the total revenues from the 
mining sector in the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt.’ 
This statement, by implication, certainly exaggerates the economic 
contribution made by bringing malaria under control.  For instance there was a 
2.33 fold rise in the price of copper between 1931 and 1949 – a price change that 
would have made it significantly more profitable to mine copper during this period.  
Nevertheless, had malaria not been brought under control these favourable market 
conditions could not have been taken advantage of to the degree they were by 
mining enterprises in Northern Rhodesia at that time.  
Commenting on the work by Sir Malcolm Watson to control malaria in tropical 
countries, Sir Eric MacFadyen (1953: vii) observed: ‘He showed that until the curse 
of malaria was lifted no advance was practicable: once malaria had been brought 
under control progress became rapid in every direction.’ 
While there is a good deal of truth in this statement – a truth rediscovered five 
or so decades later
16 - it does exaggerate the contribution made by the controlling 
                                  
14  See Watson (1953: 13 and 15).   
15 The mortality rate for the African work force fell from 33 per thousand in 1930 to 5 per thousand in 1933.  
This mortality rate stayed at around this level for the next fifteen years.  See Utzinger, Tozan and Singer 
(2001: 683). 
16 See for instance Gallup and Sachs (2001) and Batten and Martina (2007).  Earlier Kamarck 
(1988) had emphasized the importance of controlling tropical diseases as a way of facilitating 
economic development in tropical African countries.     16
of malaria.  The economic progress referred to must have been facilitated, once 
‘the curse of malaria was lifted’, by also having in place economic institutions of an 
adequate quality to protect the property rights of individuals and economic entities.  
If, by way of contrast, these institutions had been of poor quality economic 
progress almost certainly would have been impeded in Malaya in the 1910s and 
20s and beyond and in Northern Rhodesia in the 1930s and 40s.  Historical 
evidence that supports this assertion is presented in the next sub-section. 
Despite this qualification, the three case histories just sketched out indicate 
the central importance of bringing tropical diseases under control if there is to be 
any chance of sustained economic development in tropical countries.  The 
relevance of this observation for the present discussion is that in the 1990s and 
beyond malaria had not yet been brought under control in these countries.  While 
attempts were made to control this disease from the 1950s on, there were various 
weaknesses with the international program implemented at that time aimed at 
containing malaria in tropical and sub-tropical countries.
17  Consequently, while the 
prevalence of malaria did decline up to the early 1990s it began to increase from 
then on so that by 2002 some 48 per cent of the world’s population was at risk of 
contracting this disease.  What is more, while in 2002 the bulk of malaria morbidity 
and mortality cases were to be found in sub-Saharan Africa (53 per cent), a sizable 
proportion of the disease burden caused by this disease now was to be found in 
South Asia (33 per cent).  (See Hay et al. 2004, especially Tables 1 and 4).
18 
19
                                  
17 The weaknesses associated with this program in public health are discussed in Gramiccia and Beales (1988).  
18 In India in the last few decades of the 20
th century two changes contributed to raising the risk of contracting 
malaria in that country.  First, the Plasmodium parasite became increasingly resistant to chloroquine (the main drug   17
2.2 Changing the level of health and the quality of economic institutions. 
Malaria was prevalent throughout most of Italy in the late 19th century and 
into the early 20th century.
20  It also was recognized by various individuals in Italian 
society at that time that this disease imposed a significant burden (of an indefinite 
size) on the Italian economy – especially Italian agriculture.  This fact, along with 
the major discoveries made in Italy in the late 19
th century concerning what factors 
caused malaria, no doubt motivated the concerted effort made in that country to 
bring malaria under control after 1900.
21  These efforts saw the death rate for 
malaria fall from around 500 per million in 1900 to 75 per million in 1914.   
No obvious significant economic benefits flowed, however, from this marked 
improvement in the level of health in Italy in the period immediately after this 
improvement.  The reason was that the eruption in 1914 of the First World War and 
the aftermath of this war eliminated any possible immediate benefits.  Put 
differently, this war and its aftermath resulted in a collapse of economic institutions 
from 1914 on in Italy (and elsewhere) that undermined any economic benefits that 
might have been generated by the controlling of malaria in that country between 
1900 and 1914.   
(While some economic benefits did begin to emerge in parts of Italy as a 
result of the anti-malaria campaign before 1914 and as a consequence of 
                                                                                                    
used to treat malaria).  Second, P. vivax (a comparatively weak strain of malaria) began to be replaced by P 
falciparum (the most virulent strain of malaria) at a comparatively rapid rate.  See Attara et al. (2006: 250). 
19 The economic burdens imposed by malaria are partially mitigated by individuals building up incomplete 
immunity to this disease.  This incomplete immunity – through individuals acquiring sickle blood cells – 
imposes, however, significant burdens on individuals and the community.  This matter is discussed in Batten 
and Martina (2007) and the references cited there.   
20 The references drawn upon in the main text are Amorosa Jr., Corbellini and Coluzzi (2005) and Snowden (2006: 
Chs 1 and 2, and 222 – 3). 
21 The world centre for malaria research at that time was Rome.  See Snowden (2006) on this point.    18
additional campaigns in the late 1920s and 1930s,
22 it might be conjectured that 
the full economic benefits of bringing malaria under control only began to emerge 
once adequate economic institutions began to be established again in Italy after 
the ending of the Second World War.  It would seem difficult, however, to provide a 
cogent test (based on data just for Italy) of this conjecture.) 
The implication of this particular piece of Italian history, considered in 
conjunction with the historical episodes discussed in the previous sub-section is 
that an adequate level of economic institutions needs to be in place if economic 
benefits are likely to flow from the controlling of virulent infectious diseases.  This 
theme is developed in the next sub-section. 
2.3 A high level of health and changing the quality of economic institutions. 
In 1970 The People’s Republic of China had an adult male mortality rate of 
248 per thousand adults which at that time was not far above that for the average 
high-income country (204 per thousand adults) and below that for the average low-
middle income country (273 per thousand) and well below that for the average low-
income country (385 per thousand adults).  Drawing on the argument set out in 
sub-Sections 2.1 and 2.2 it would appear that China in the early-1970s had 
attained at least the minimum level of health required to allow this country to begin 
to move along the path of economic development towards attaining a 
comparatively high level of real per capita income.  And yet, in total contradiction to 
this supposition in the mid-1970s China was a low-income country and its 
economy was growing at a comparatively slow rate (compared to what was to 
                                  
22 See Snowden (2006: 83 and Ch 6).   19
come later).  (This country had attained a real per capita income per annum of 
about $(PPP) 250 in the mid-1970s whereas the per capita income per annum for 
the average low income country at that time was approximately $(PPP) 440.)
23  
That China found itself in this situation at that time can be put down, in part at 
least, to the fact that there was a lack of economic institutions that protected 
individual and group property rights.
24  
This last assertion is supported by the fact that after the economic reform 
process was set in train in China from late 1978 on – reforms that aimed in part at 
providing individuals or groups of individuals or economic entities with a greater 
level of protection of their property rights against the predatory behavior of the 
State
25 - the Chinese economy began to grow almost immediately at a significantly 
faster pace.  (Between 1979 through to 1988 GDPPC for China grew at about 8.7 
per cent per annum which was just over three times the rate of growth for this 
economy over the period 1960 through to 1977.
26)  As more economic reforms 
were introduced this economy continued to grow at a remarkably high rate so that 
by about 2004 China had become a lower middle-income country.
27   
                                  
23  All data is drawn from the World Bank (2006), World Development Indicators. 
24 The relevant historical factual detail alluded to in the main text is to be found, for example, in Lin, Cai and Li 
(2003), Chow (2002), especially Qian (2003) and World Bank (2005: 122- 124).   
25 See Qian (2003) and World Bank (2005) discussions on the ways that economic institutions were modified to 
better suit the economic and political circumstances to be found in China after 1978.  Also see Pistor and Wellons 
(1998, especially Chs 3 and 4) for a discussion of the evolution of the legal system in China after 1978.   
26 The accuracy of the official estimates of the average rate of growth of GDP for the period 1978 through to the 
late-1990s has been questioned by various scholars.  Maddison (1998, 2006) in particular has argued that the 
growth rate cited in the main text is overstated by about 2.3 percentage points.  This view has been challenged by 
Holz (2006a, b) who maintains that the official estimates are more or less accurate.  Be that as it may, the central 
argument in the main text remains in tact - assuming that Maddison’s estimate is an upper-bound measure of the 
error in the rate of growth of GDPPC of interest here. 
27 Actually the improvement in the quality of economic institutions in China from late 1978 on came at the end of a 
period of one hundred and forty years during which Chinese society experienced extended periods of political instability.  
That being the case, and given the pace at which the Chinese economy developed after 1978, that year (1978) can be 
viewed as a highly momentous one in modern Chinese economic history.  The political instability alluded to began with   20
While these economic reforms after 1978 contributed in important ways 
towards making this improved economic performance possible, nevertheless the 
case histories cited in sub-Section 2.1 imply that this improved performance of the 
Chinese economy would not have been attainable had the population of China in 
the mid-1970s experienced the level of health to be found in the average low-
income country at that time, and that this assumed lower level of health remained 
at that level from then on up to the present.   
To summarize, the deep determinants, that appear to explain at least some of 
the outstanding economic performance of the Chinese economy between 1978 
and 2004, are: (i) the relatively high level of health (as measured by the adult 
mortality rate) attained in China by the 1970s and then followed by (ii) the 
introduction of at least adequate appropriate economic institutions from late 1978 
on that helped to increase the security of the property rights for individuals, groups 
of individuals and economic entities.  As will be pointed out in sub-Section 4.3.2.2, 
this sequence of relevant changes, followed by a marked increase in the pace of 
economic development, is not unique to China.  There were a number of other 
countries in the latter part of the 20
th century and into the 21
st century that followed 
this path towards achieving, or attempting to achieve sustained economic 
development. 
                                                                                                    
the First Anglo-Sino War (1839 – 42).  From that period on there were, for instance, the Second Anglo-Sino War (1857 
– 60), the Taiping Rebellion (1850 – 1864), the Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 95), the period of warlordism (late 1910s 
and 1920s), the intermittent civil war waged between the Guomindang (Nationalists) and the Communist armies (1927 - 
1949), the invasion and occupation of parts of China by Japan and the attempts by the Chinese armies to expel the 
Japanese army (1937 – 1945), the Korean War (1950 – 53), The Great Leap Forward and the subsequent Great 
Famine (1957 – 1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1978).  For far more details concerning these events see, for 
instance, Spence (1990).   21
[This interpretation of the recent economic history of China is at variance with 
that provided by Ravallion and Chen (2007: 38).  Specifically, they point out that 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had, amongst other things, 
resulted in ‘… the rural population being forced into collective farming (with weak 
incentives for work) ….’  This rural population remembered, however, how to farm 
individually so that immediately after the post-1978 economic reforms ‘… there 
were some relatively easy gains to be had by undoing these failed policies – by de-
collectivizing agriculture and shifting the responsibility for farming to households.’  
No mention is made, however, of the fact that China had raised its level of health 
between say 1955 - 59 and 1978 so that by this latter data it had reached a 
comparatively high level.
28  And, to reiterate the point made earlier, had this not 
been the case - and China had only attained the level of health to be found in the 
average low-income country of the mid-1970s and this level of health had 
remained at this level - the relevant comparative historical evidence (and the 
evidence to be presented later) suggests that the post-1978 economic reforms in 
China probably would not have resulted in the exceptional performance of the 
Chinese economy from 1979 on to the end of the 20
th century and beyond.] 
3. Initial elements of a theory of the poverty trap  
Before turning to a formal analysis that draws on the insights provided by the 
discussion in the previous section more needs to be said about the channels along 
                                  
28 Since there is more detailed information available for the under-five mortality rate than there is 
for the male adult mortality data, the former is cited here as a measure of health.  In 1955 – 59 
the under-five mortality rate per thousand live births for China was 225 and by 1975 - 79 it had 
fallen to 75 deaths per thousand.  [See Ahmad et al. (2000: 1181 – 2).]  And as will be argued 
later in the main text, an under-five mortality rate of around 75 per thousand is at or near a 
threshold level of health that is necessary (but not sufficient) for stimulating a significant increase 
in the pace of sustained economic development.    22
which a change in the level of health in a community is thought to influence various 
other variables that, in turn, influence the level of economic development in this 
community.  Institutions also are introduced into the argument, albeit to perform a 
lesser rôle in the analysis.   
At this point in this discussion a good deal of detailed micro-economic 
theorizing could be introduced into the discussion.  This will not be done here, 
however, if for no other reason than this would clutter the discussion considerably.  
Instead the present line of argument will draw on the insights or conjectures 
provided by others in the attempt to identify the major channels along which a 
change in the level of a particular mortality rate (children under five, or adult males, 
or total) in a developing country is thought to influence the functioning of the 
economy for this community.  These insights, which are taken as given, will be 
applied later in the process of modifying the standard neoclassical economic 
growth model. 
3.1 Capital accumulation and technological change
29
  It was indicated in Section 2 that comparatively high levels of morbidity and 
mortality amongst the labor force in a developing country will increase the cost of 
labor which, in turn, will tend to discourage investments in physical capital.   
Equally, these high mortality and morbidity rates will discourage investment by 
firms in the training of labor.  The resulting lack of local skilled labor probably also 
is not easily supplemented by hiring skilled labor elsewhere.  If this outside labor is 
                                  
29 The discussion in the next three sub-sections in the main text draws on the case histories sketched out in Section 
2 and the relevant arguments to be found in, for instance, Gersovitz (1983), Martina (1996), Galor and Weil (2000), 
Sachs and Malaney (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), Malaney, Speilman and Sachs (2004), Chakraborty (2004), Sala-
i-Martin (2005), Belli, Bustereo and Preker (2005), Lorentzen, McMacMillan and Wacziarg (2005), Soares (2005) and 
Galor (2005a, 2005b) and Moav (2005).    23
not immune to the range of diseases to be found in the country concerned then this 
non-indigenous labor may be costly to hire, and if it can be hired there is the risk 
that this labor will experience comparatively high morbidity and mortality rates.   
Perhaps most important of all, the reduced levels of investment in physical and 
human capital resulting from comparatively high mortality and morbidity rates in the 
country concerned will tend to impede the inflow of new technology and its 
exploitation in this developing country.  This is so since this technology and know-
how would need to be embodied either in physical or human capital or both.  This 
reduced level of technological change, in turn, would tend to reduce the rate of 
return on investments in physical and human capital and, thus, would tend to 
diminish yet further the incentive to invest in physical capital and the education of 
the labor force.  Hence a marked change in the level of health in this country will 
tend to set in train amplification effects as the level of human and physical capital 
formation and technological change interact between one another.  (This sort of 
amplification effects have been emphasized by Chakraborty (2004).)  These 
effects will only tend to occur, however, if (as is suggested by the discussion in 
Section 2) institutions are of a level so that individual property rights are always 
adequately protected.   
  Comparatively high under-five child morbidity rates also will tend to 
discourage school attendance while comparatively high under-five child and adult 
mortality and morbidity rates will tend to reduce the rate of return on investments in 
education.  The economic return on what investments are made in the education of 
children probably is reduced still further by the fact that high under-five child   24
morbidity rates, due say to cerebral malaria, will tend to lower the cognitive and 
motor skills of the children who do recover from the relevant disease(s).
30  The 
response by households will tend to be a reduction in the level of investment in the 
education of children.
31  Finally, a comparatively high level of morbidity and 
mortality in a poor community will result in, amongst other things, a relatively high 
proportion of household incomes being expended on preventive and curative 
medical procedures.  This leaves even less of the meager household incomes to 
be saved and invested in capital formation of any kind. 
3.2 Demographic considerations 
The influence of comparatively high mortality rates, and the under-five 
mortality rate (U5MR) in particular, and changes in the level of these mortality rates 
in a developing country on the rate of growth of population, and hence the rate of 
growth of the labor force, in this country is a more complicated issue to fathom.  
Certainly in the simple case the outcome is obvious.  Assuming that all relevant 
considerations are ignored, except that parents in this country have acquired (for 
whatever reason) the number of children they desire, then an increase in the 
U5MR will be offset exactly by parents increasing the level of the total fertility rate 
(TFR) so that the number of surviving children remain unchanged.  Hence the rate 
of growth of population remains constant. 
This conclusion is questionable however if a range of additional relevant 
considerations is introduced into the argument.  For instance, if an improvement in 
                                  
30 See Carter et al. (2005) 
31 The adverse consequence of a high incidence of malaria on the level of education in the community concerned is 
not a new idea.  This link was commented upon by various individuals in Italy in the early part of the 20
th century.  
See Snowden (2006: 17 and 93) on this point.   25
health (viz. a reduction in mortality rates) is large enough and there are some 
favorable economic conditions already in place – such as the presence of 
economic institutions of an adequate quality – that also assists in stimulating the 
rate of technological change and the rate of physical capital accumulation, then 
these changes will tend to result in a comparatively high expected rate of return on 
investments in the education of children.  This latter change in turn will induce a 
switch in household expenditures away from acquiring children towards investing 
in the level of education of children.  In addition, the increased economic 
opportunities available will create more economic opportunities for females.  Both 
these types of changes will increase the opportunity cost for households of 
acquiring children.  The consequence of these increased opportunity costs is that 
the TFR will decline.  This decline will release additional household resources to be 
invested in the education of children and so on.
32  At the end of this multiplier 
adjustment process the TFR may well have declined by more than the initial 
decrease in the U5MR.  Consequently the rate of growth of population decreases 
in size as a consequence of a fall in the U5MR taking place in a suitable economic 
environment.
33
3.3 Influence of health on institutions   
                                  
32 The line argument presented in the main text draws in part on the more detailed relevant argument to be 
found, drawing on Becker and Lewis (1973), in Martina (1996).  A similar argument is to be found in Galor 
and Weil (2000).  Also see Galor (2005b: especially 499 – 501) and Conley, McCord and Sachs (2007).  
33 Based on various models - that allow for the precautionary motive for acquiring children and investing the 
education of children - Doepke (2005) concludes that a fall in the child mortality rate (presumably this means the 
under-five child mortality rate), while it induces a fall in the TFR, does not also stimulate a fall in the rate of growth 
of population.  The models constructed by Doepke do not allow, however, for the possibility that a fall in the under-
five mortality rate, given an adequate initial level of health and institutions will generate an increase in the demand 
for appropriately skilled labor – an increase that may well induce a substantial increase in the level of investment 
in the education of children at the expense of the quantity of children.  In these circumstance the rate of growth of 
population may well fall.    26
At the macro level it also is likely that the level of health in a community will 
influence the level of economic institutions.  One possible channel of causation is, 
as argued by Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005), that the existence of 
comparatively high mortality rates within a developing country will discourage the 
inflow of new knowledge and skills required to allow the development of relevant 
economic institutions required by an economy to modernize.  Another possible 
channel of causation, however, is that a fall in the level of health in a community 
reduces the level of investment in the education – education that is required, 
amongst other things, to develop the knowledge and skills required to facilitate the 
introduction and development of appropriate economic institutions.  (A similar point 
has been made by Glaeser et al. (2004) although they do not mention the 
connection between the level of health and the level of investment in the 
education.  Rather they only discuss the link from the level of education through to 
the quality of institutions.  This theme is expanded upon in Glaeser et al. (2006).)
34
It follows that according to this theory the level of health and the level of 
institutions are not mutually exclusive variables.  The interaction between these 
two variables works by way of the level of health, in part through education, and 
which in turn both influence the level of institutions.   
To summarize the argument sketched out so far in this section, an increase in 
the level of health in a developing community is hypothesized to: (i) increase the 
level of the savings rate and hence the level of investment in physical and human 
capital; (ii) increase the level of economic efficiency; (iii) increase the level of 
                                  
34 A related literature is surveyed by Levine (2005)   27
technical efficiency; (iv) decrease the total fertility rate and the rate of growth of 
population (if required economic circumstances are in place) and, hence, the labor 
force; and (v) increase the level or quality of economic institutions.
35 
36
3.4 The influence of institutions on health and the amplification effect 
A number of distinct types of institutions also would tend to influence the level 
of health.  For instance the maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of 
individual and/or group property rights would be required to ensure a peaceful 
enough social/political environment within which to allow public health programs to 
be implemented effectively.  In addition, the institutional quality of the public health 
programs themselves certainly will influence how successfully a community will be 
able to increase its level of health.
37   
Thus changes in the level of both economic and public-health institutions are 
likely to influence the level of health that, in turn, will influence the level of 
development of the country concerned.  These changes, as before, will set in train 
                                  
35 The summary provided in the main text, of the various channels along which the level of health is thought 
to influence various aspects of the economy for a poor country, raises the issue of whether these assumed 
channels of causation are supported by any empirical evidence.  This matter and related theoretical issues 
are discussed in Martina (2007).  
36 Within a modified production-function framework McDonald and Roberts (2006) attempted to determine the 
influence of the immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic on the 
rate of economic growth for a representative country, or countries.  They assumed, however, that the relevant 
health variable operates only along two channels of causation when influencing the rate of economic growth – 
the direct route and the indirect route operating through the rate of growth of population.  The argument in the 
main text implies, however, that this assumption probably understates the number of channels along which this 
pandemic operates.  (Specifically, the health variable is also likely to operate through changes in the levels of 
physical and human capital, and the rate of technological change.)  Consequently the McDonald-Roberts 
assumption will tend to result in an understatement of the influence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the rate of 
economic growth for the countries concerned. 
Another probably flaw in the McDonald-Roberts analysis is that no allowance is made for non-linearities and 
discontinuities in the economic growth process.  The importance of allowing for these considerations is 
emphasized in sub-Section 7.5 in the main text.  
37 Within the context of the attaining a satisfactory level of health, the need to make the distinction between the 
provision of public health institutions and economic institutions also is touched upon by Arora (2005: 230 – 1) - 
albeit with respect to Great Britain in the late 19
th century.  A discussion in Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett (2000) is 
related to this topic.    28
an interaction between the levels of health and institutions respectively, while such 
an interaction should amplify the influence of an initial change in the level of health, 
or an initial change in the level of institutions taken separately on the level of output 
in the modern sector.  To explain, suppose that initially there is an increase in the 
level of health.  This change will influence the level of institutions.  The resulting 
increase in the level of economic institutions in turn will increase the level of health.  
Next, this change in the level of health naturally will set off yet another sequence of 
changes in the levels of institutions and health respectively.  Presumably, however, 
the second-round changes in the level of health and institutions respectively are 
not as large as the initial changes in these two deep determinants.  Eventually, 
therefore, this hypothesized amplification effect will peter out.  
3.5 Basic levels of health and institutions and the interaction effect 
The discussion in Section 2 and that in the previous four sub-sections 
suggests a basic economic model that highlights certain fundamental binding 
constraints that probably face poor developing countries.  To begin to explain, 
consider how the levels of health and institutions may interact with one another.  It 
is assumed that there is a modern sector and a traditional sector in the economy.  
There are two deep determinants that are inputs in the production process in the 
modern sector – health and institutions.  Both of these inputs have to be provided 
up to their respective minimum levels before the minimum level of output (X) - min 
X (>0) - can be produced profitably in the modern sector of the economy over a 
sustained period.  If the level of health is below this minimum level then nothing 
profitably can be produced in a sustained way in this modern sector.  And this is so   29
even if the level of the quality of institutions is well above the minimum level.   
Equally institutions need to be provided up to some minimum level if a modern 
sector is to exist.  If not then again no matter what the level of health nothing 
profitably can be produced in a sustained way in the modern sector. 
The three historical case studies sketched out in sub-Section 2.1 allude to the 
situation where initially the level of health (H) is below the minimum required but 
institutions (I) are at an adequate level to allow sustained economic development; 
viz. H < min H and I ≥ min I.  Only when the level of health is brought up to the 
minimum or threshold level required is sustained economic development a 
possibility.  
In contrast, the fifth case study outlined in sub-Section 2.3 (viz. China in the 
late 1970s and later) indicates the situation where the level of health is at least up 
to the minimum level required to facilitate sustained economic development 
whereas the level of the economic institutions is below the minimum level required; 
viz., I < min I and H ≥ min H.  Again once the level of institutions is raised to the 
minimum level required only then is sustained economic development a possibility. 
Finally, the fourth case study sketched out in sub-Section 2.2 (viz. that for 
Italy in the late 19
th and into the 20
th centuries) also serves to emphasize an 
important lesson; viz. even if the level of health is brought up to min H and, initially, 
I ≥ min I, these requirements have to be maintained over the long-term if sustained 
economic development is to be experienced.  Should the level of institutions   30
collapse, for instance, then sustained economic development is likely not to 
occur.
38   
These various observations imply, therefore, that at least at the minimum 
level of output in the modern sector these two deep determinants are combined in 
a Leontief fixed-coefficient production function: viz.  
at X = min X (>0), 
X = min (H, I), 
 (3.1) 
whereas if H < min H, or I < min I, or both then X = 0. 
Next the statement in (3.1) is modified to take into account the argument that 
health and institutions interact with one another.  Specifically, the level of economic 
institutions is likely to be influenced by the levels of health and education (e), and 
the level of health possibly is influenced by the levels of economic institutions and 
public health institutions (h).  Hence, 
at X = min X (>0), 
X = min {H, H[I, h], I, I[H, e(H)]}, 
  (3.2) 
whereas if H < min {H, H[I, h]}, or I < min {I, I[H, e(H)]}, or both then X = 0.   
These assumptions are represented in Figure 3.1 by the right-angled isoquant 
marked X = min {H, H[I, h], I, I[H, e(H)]}.  If H is less than min H, or I is less than 
                                  
38 The situation just referred to in the main text alludes to the general issue of the influence of 
negative economic shocks on the economy for the representative country.  This matter is 
discussed in Martina (2007).    31
min I or both then nothing is produced in the modern sector of the economy.  For 
the sake of realism the assumption also represented in Figure 3.1 is the likely 
possibility that as the level of output in the modern sector rises above the minimum 
level then there will be an increasing level of substitution between health and 
economic institutions.  This assumption represents the idea that once more than 
the minimum level of output in the modern sector has been attained it is less 
crucial that a threshold level of health or a threshold level of institutions is required 
to produce some given level of output (greater than min X). 
 
Insert Figure 3.1 about here.  
 
Also represented in Figure 3.1 is the idea (discussed in the previous sub-
section) that the levels of health and institutions may interact with one another 
such as to create an amplification effect.  Suppose, for instance, that the economy 
initially is at the point marked õ where both the level of health and the level of 
economic institutions are below their respective minimum levels necessary to allow 
a positive amount of X to be produced.  Now the level of health is increased above 
its minimum level while the level of economic institutions remains, to begin with, at 
its initial level.  The economy, therefore, goes from point õ to point b.  The 
assumptions set out earlier allow for the possibility, however, that this initial 
increase in the level of health will operate through a number of channels to bring 
about an increase the level of institutions, and the increases in the levels of these 
two deep determinants continue to interact with one another to amplify the initial   32
increase in the level of health.  This amplification effect (resulting from the initial 
increase in the level of health) is represented by the economy moving directly to 
point c in Figure 3.1.  At point c the economy now begins to produce output in the 
modern sector.   
It may not turn out like this, however.  The economy may just move from the 
point marked õ to point c* and stay there until such time as more direct effort is 
made to improve the quality of economic institutions.   
Alternatively, starting at the initial point õ in Figure 3.1, the level of economic 
institutions is increased above the minimum level to take the economy to point d.  
The interaction between institutions and health takes the economy to point d*.   
This representation in Figure 3.1 implies that more explicit effort is required to raise 
the level of health up to the minimum level required to allow a sustainable modern 
sector to emerge.  
3.5.1 Attaining a basic level of health before the interaction process begins. 
A particular case, alluded to in the three case histories discussed in sub-
Section 2.1, is that where some basic level of health needs to be attained (which is 
below the minimum level required for sustained economic development) before 
any interaction between health and economic institutions can begin to take place.  
This can be demonstrated by the following thought experiment.  Suppose in the 
Panama Canal case it was only possible for the authorities to reduce the adult 
mortality rate (of about 330 per thousand) along the canal corridor by 20 per cent 
over the period 1905 up to 1915 – and not the 100 per cent reduction that actually 
occurred.  In these assumed circumstances it seems reasonable to assert that this   33
engineering project would not have been completed by 1914 – if at all.  And this 
was so even though economic institutions of a comparatively high quality were 
readily available to be applied and exploited.  The adult mortality rate was simply 
still too high for health and institutions to interact with one another. 
This idea is represented in Figure 3.1 by the vertical light-dotted lines on the 
left-hand side of that diagram.  These vertical lines represent the assumption that 
no matter what the level of economic institutions, the comparatively low level of 
health does not interact with economic institutions.  A consequence is that in this 
extremely-low-health representative country it cannot move towards being in a 
position to establish the beginnings of a modern sector in the economy.  Such a 
country can be thought of as being faced with a health-only poverty trap – a case 
that is returned to at various points in the subsequent discussion.   
3.6 Modifying the Solow-Swan growth model 
The lines of argument set out in the previous sub-sections now are combined 
within the framework of the neoclassical growth model devised by Solow (1956) and 
Swan (1956) respectively.
39  There are two factors of production, capital (K) and labor 
(L) combined in a production function in which there is constant returns to scale so that 
y = , where y denotes the output/labor ratio, k denotes the capital/labor ratio 
and A represents the amount of total factor productivity.  This function is twice 
differentiable and there are diminishing returns to a single factor of production.
Af(k)
40    
                                  
39 For a discussion of this model see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: Ch. 1). 
40 Put more generally, the Inada condition requires that:   34
It also is assumed that there are two countries - a poor country, P, in which 
low levels of health, or institutions or both apply and a rich country, R, in which 
comparatively high levels of both health and institutions are present.  The total 
output per unit of labor in country i,  is the sum of that produced in the modern 
sector (if any) and that produced in the traditional sector (if any).  Based on these 
assumptions it can be shown that, for country i:  
i y




                                                                                                  
,  (3.3) 
for country i = P or R.  
For country i the term ( ) denotes the rate of change of  ,  denotes 
the savings ratio,   denotes the rate of growth of the labor force and  (>0) 
denotes the rate of depreciation of capital.  The term   represents the 
neoclassical production function for country i. 
i k/ k
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The modification of (3.3) begins by returning to the general line of argument 
represented in Figure 3.1.  If either the level of health or the level of economic 
institutions does not, or both do not, meet the minimum or threshold levels required 
then it is not profitable to invest in the modern sector of the economy – although 
there has to be some positive investment in capital, no matter how small, in the 
traditional sector of the economy.  This implies that there is a threshold level of the 
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T k = k{min[H, H(I, h), I, I(H, e(H))]. (3.4) 
For simplicity it is assumed here that this threshold level of the capital-labor ratio is 
the same for both countries – the poor and the rich.   
If country P does not satisfy either or both of the constraints embodied in the 
threshold level of the capital-labor ratio then this country will not possess a modern 
sector.  That country R satisfies both of these constraints implies that it will 
possess such a sector.  In this broad set of circumstances the observations made 
at the beginning of this section imply that the economy for country P will possess 
quite a different range of fundamental properties or characteristics compared to 
those for country R.   
These differences are expressed as follows.  The initial assumptions are that 
 < min (H) <  , and that   < min (I) <  .  It also is assumed, initially, that 
country P and country R are to be compared around   so that the relevant 
capital-labor ration for P, , is just below  , and the relevant capital-labor 
ration for R,  , is just above  .  Hence the condition,  , applies in 
the situation being assumed here.   





T k PR kk ≈
Next the observations made earlier in this section are drawn upon – 
observations that were concerned with determining the likely influence that the 
levels of health and institutions respectively will have on other (proximate 
determinants) variables such as the level of savings and technological change in   36
the economy.  Applying simplified notation, it follows from those observations that 
where  just either side of  :  PR kk ≈
T k
     PP P RR R s( H, I) s( H , I) <  (3.5a) 
     (3.5b)  PP P R RR A(H ,I ) = A  <  A =A(H ,I )  
PP p P P P R R RR R R  f[ k( H, I) ]  =  f( k)  <  f( k)  =  f[ k( H, I) ]  (3.5c) 
so that   
PP PP P P PP
PP
{ s  ( H, I) [ A ( H, I) f( k( H, I) ] }
k(H ,I )
 < 
RR RRR R RR
RR
{s(H ,I )[A(H ,I )f (k (H ,I )]}
k(H ,I )
. (3.5d) 
The discussion in sub-Section 3.2 also suggests that probably 
  .                 (3.5e)  PP P RR R [n (H , I  + δ) > [n (H ,I ) + δ] ]
A little more is said about the inequalities set out in (3.5c), (3.5d) and (3.5e).  
That in (3.5c) represents two lines of argument.  The one is that if a country only 
attains a comparatively low level of health this will reduce the level of economic 
efficiency since labor is unable to work a reasonable number of hours per week, or 
if able to do so this labor is only able to work at a reduced level of effort.  This lack 
of labor efficiency also will reduce the level of efficiency in the use of capital – due 
to the labor force, that is in poor health, being unable to fully utilize the capital 
stock available.  The other line of argument represented in (3.5c) is that if only a 
relatively low level of institutions is reached then this almost certainly will result in 
factors of production being misallocated, or inefficiently utilized in the economy.   37
A further implication of the assumption set out in (5.5.c) is that f(k) no longer 
satisfies the Inada conditions mentioned (parenthetically) earlier.  The details 
regarded this assertion are ignored here except to say that in the neighborhood of 
the standard neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to a single factor 
no longer applies.   
T k
As for the inequality in (3.5d), it follows from the inequalities set out in (3.5a) 
to (3.5c) and the condition that the two countries (P and R) are being compared at 
a capital-labor ratio just below and just above   so that 
T k
R P kk ≈ .   
Finally, the inequality in (3.5e) in part follows from the assumption that there is 
no obvious reason why the depreciation rate, δ, should vary between country P 
and country R. 
The inequalities set out in (3.5) are represented in Figure 4.1 in the next 
section, although in order not to clutter that figure details regarding the notion 
employed have been omitted.  Also represented in that figure is the threshold level 
of the capital-labor ratio,  , defined earlier in (3.4). 
T k
To allow that figure to represent interesting cases, however, two additional 
reasonable assumptions are imposed that apply in the initially situation; viz.:  
at a   an infinitesimal small amount below    P k
T k
PP PP P P PP
PP
{ s ( H, I) [ A ( H, I) f( k( H, I) ] }
k(H ,I )
 =   <  PP (k /k )
•
()
P n δ +     (3.6a) 
and at a   an infinitesimal small amount above       R k
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()
P n δ + .    (3.6b). 
The former assumption must be satisfied if the Poor country is to be unable to 
reach the threshold capital-labor ration, in which case this country is trapped in 
poverty.  What occurs when the representative poor country does not satisfy this 
assumption is discussed later.  
The latter assumption is what is required if the Rich country is to be able to 
operate at a capital-labor ratio greater than the threshold level.  This means that it 
must have managed to surmount the fundamental constraint on some previous 
occasion.   
 
4. Interpreting, applying and the initial testing of the model 
The representation of the modified version of the Solow-Swan growth model 
set out in Figure 4.1 can be interpreted to cover a range of situations.  As 
explained in the previous section the fundamental constraint set out in (3.2) - and 
which is embodied in the threshold level of the capital-output ratio, defined in (3.4), 
represented in Figure 4.1 - centers on the assumption that there are threshold or 
minimum levels of health and economic institutions respectively that both have to 
be attained in order to raise significantly the probability of a sustained increase in   39




Insert Figure 4.1 about here. 
 
4.1 Multi-equilibria steady states 
4.1.1 Based on the health-cum-institutions poverty trap 
The Poor country, as assumed earlier, does not satisfy the fundamental 
constraint by not fulfilling at least one of the basic requirements: ≥ min H and 
≥ min I.  This assumption requires that the economy for this poor county 
operates along a capital-accumulation function,   - such as 
that marked as Odm in Figure 4.1.  Where this function cuts the line marked 
 is the point marked d – a point at which the economy for the Poor country 
is at its steady state.  The associated steady-state capital-labor ratio is  .  The 
level of this capital-labor ratio reflects the assumption that this economy is unable 
to reach, as implied by the assumption set out in (3.6a), the threshold capital-labor 
ratio,  .  If it could begin to converge on the country R by reaching this capital-
labor ratio it would have satisfied, by implication, the fundamental constraint.   
P H
P I
PP P P P {[s A f (k )]/k }




                                  
41 Parenthetically, Figure 4.1 bears a resemblance to that to be found in Durlauf and Johnson (1995, Figure 
6.1) and Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005: 623).  (Also see Durlauf (2003).)  The logic applied to derive 
Figure 4.1 in the main text is quite different, however, to that employed by Durlauf and Johnson.  They 
emphasized, drawing on Azariadis and Drazen (1990), the matters of literacy rates and human capital in 
order to generate a threshold level for the capital-labor ratio, in the main text a deeper set the factors are 
considered and applied.  Durlauf et al. also do not allow for demographic effects.    40
It seems reasonable to expect that over the long term poor countries, which 
are unable to surmount the fundamental constraint, will gravitate to their respective 
steady-state capital-labor ratios that are at levels below  .  These countries, 
therefore, are trapped at relatively low levels of the capital-labor ratio (and hence at 
low levels of per capita income).  The fact that a poor country finds itself in this 
situation does not rule out the possibility that this country may experience some 
positive growth of GDPPC – albeit relatively low levels of economic growth.  This is 
especially so, as alluded to in Figure 4.1, if the country moves towards 
surmounting the fundamental constraint.  This issue will be returned to later in this 
section.   
T k
While the representative steady-state point for the Poor country is taken as 
the location of one of the steady-state equilibria that applies amongst the national 
economies of the world, the other equilibrium is at the steady state for the Rich 
country.  This equilibrium is represented by the point marked g in Figure 4.1.  The 
associated capital-labor ratio is   - a capital-labor ratio located at a level above 
.  This is so since this country has surmounted the fundamental constraint - as 
is implied by the assumption set out in (3.6b).  This assumption, along with those 
set out in (3.5), initially allowed this country to shift up on to the capital-
accumulation function marked as   in Figure 4.1 – a function 
that starts at point f and goes through point g in that figure.  Beginning at point f, 
this country now traverses along this capital-accumulation function until it reaches 
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per unit of labor is equal to the rate of growth of the labor force plus that rate of 
capital depreciation.   
Countries that have tended to becoming rich for a comparatively long period 
of time should gradually gravitate towards point g and cluster around this point.  
This point, therefore, represents the other steady-state equilibrium that applies to 
the economies for the rich countries of the world. 
This line of argument implies that the poor group, and the rich group of 
countries respectively converge on their respective local steady-state equilibrium.  
This concept of the localized convergence of respective groups of poor and rich 
countries Galor (1996) dubbed convergence clubs.  (Also see Mayer-Foulkes 
(2002) and the references cited there.)  An extension of this idea is proved in the 
next sub-section. 
4.1.2 Based on the health-only and health-cum-institutions poverty traps 
In Figure 4.1 is represented the argument that there is only one discontinuity in the 
capital accumulation process – a discontinuity that is created by the assumption that the 
economy has just overcome the fundamental constraint of attaining the threshold levels 
of both health and institutions respectively.  It was indicated in sub-Section 3.5, 
however, that a discontinuity in the development of the economy for the representative 
country also is likely to occur at relatively extremely low levels of health.  Below this 
discontinuity no interaction takes place between health and institutions.  The 
discontinuity arises when the level of health rises to a level where the levels of health 
and institutions respectively now begin to interact with one another (as represented in 
Figure 3.1).     42
This particular case in represented in Figure 4.2 – an extension of Figure 4.1 - 
although certain details in the notation have been omitted.  The steady state level of 
capital accumulation for this very poor (VP), extremely-low-health country is 
represented by point a, with the associated capital/labor ratio  , in that figure.   
Consequently his country finds itself in the health-only poverty trap.  Next it is assumed 
that the level of health in this country increases by an adequate amount so that this 
county is able to attain the threshold point b with the associated capital/labor ratio  .  
At this threshold level of the capital/labor ratio interaction between the respective levels 
of health and institutions now begins to come into operation.  As a consequence the 
rate of capital accumulation rises significantly – which is represented by the economy 
moving from point b to point c in Figure 4.2.  From this latter point the economy 
gravitates on to the local steady state represented by point d with the associated 
capital/labor ratio  – the steady state that applies in the representative country when it 
finds itself in the health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  The rest of the argument, based 








Insert Figure 4.2 about here 
 
The theoretical ideas represented in Figure 4.2 indicate that the health-only 
poverty trap applies over the range of capital/labor ratios from 0 through to  , while 
the health-cum-institutions poverty trap operates over the range of capital/labor ratios 
T
VP k  43
T
VP k  through to  .  The presence of these two types of poverty traps creates at least 
three local equilibria. 
T
P k
4.2 Multiple Equilibria - some limited cross-country evidence 
Empirical evidence, that indicates that there is likely to be multiple steady 
states, or localized convergence amongst the national economies of the world, is 
provided by the econometric results presented in Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
42  
Additional econometric evidence is provided, by implication, later in Section 7 
(where various tests of the poverty-trap hypothesis are presented).  Here an 
alternative limited empirical test is provided by considering some relevant cross-
country macroeconomic information.   
In this part of the discussion extremely-low-health countries and low-health 
countries are combined and are treated as low-health countries.  Hence only the 
argument based on Figure 4.1 is applied here.  Within this context it is supposed 
that low-health countries, as well as low-institution countries, or both being unable 
to satisfy the fundamental constraint tend to congregate around the capital-labor 
ratio,  .  In contrast high-health and high-institution countries, that have satisfied 
the fundamental constraint, cluster around the capital-labor ratio,  .  This 
clustering allows the inference that the distribution of the level of health across 
countries will tend to be twin-peaked or bimodal.  This also is a possibility with 





                                  
42 The empirical results presented in Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003), Chakraborty, Papageorgiou and 
Sebastián (2005) and Graham and Temple (2006) - which suggest that a poverty trap may face certain countries of 
the world - also imply that multiple equilibria may exist.   44
supported by the empirical evidence then the theory based on Figure 4.1 also 
implies that the distribution of GDPPC across countries equally should take a twin-
peaked or bimodal form.   
To determine if the distribution of the level of health across countries indeed is 
bimodal two measures of health are considered here.  The one measure is the 
under-five child mortality rate (U5MR) while the other is the total mortality rate 
(TMR).  Both measures of mortality applied here are averages for relevant cohorts 
of countries for the early 1980s.  (The definition for each of these measures and 
the data sources employed are set out in Table 6.1 in Section 6.)  In the process of 
determining the respective distributions for these two mortality rates, however, a 
further implication of the theory based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1 need to be taken into 
account; viz. if a country has not attained the threshold level of health (or Min H) it 
will tend to be trapped in poverty no matter how far its level of health is below the 
threshold level.  This observation suggests, therefore, that all countries that have 
not satisfied some reasonable definition of the threshold level of health should be 
grouped together and be treated as all being approximately within the 




Charts 4.1 and 4.2 come about here. 
 
The resulting distribution for the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) is 
represented by the histogram set out in Chart 4.1 and that for the total mortality   45
rate (TMR) is set out in Charts 4.2.  As can be seen in each of these charts, the 
distributions for both of these mortality rates, or alternative measures of health are 
bi-modal.  (In the instance of Chart 4.1 the threshold level of health is set, for the 
U5MR, at 80 child deaths per thousand live births.
43  T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  a  
reasonable measure for this threshold.
44  In the instance of the TMR in Chart 4.2 
the threshold (or Min H based on the TMR) is set at 17 per thousand.
45) 
What is emphasized is passing is that the information represented in Chart 
4.3 implies that most countries of the world in the early 1980s had an U5MR of 80 
or more deaths per thousand live births.  The comparatively small high-health 
group, in contrast, had a U5MR of 20 or less deaths per thousand live births. 
A similar exercise is also carried out with respect to economic institutions.  
The measure of institutions considered here is the risk of repudiation of contracts 
by government in the early 1980s.  The representation of the distribution for this 
measure of institutions across countries is represented by the histogram set out in 
Chart 4.3.  It indicates that this distribution also is bimodal.  In this instance the 
range of values went from the lowest measure (which means the highest risk of 
repudiation) to the highest measure of institutions.
46  The distribution represented 
                                  
43 The respective ranges for the U5MR distribution are: 0 to 19 deaths per thousand live births, 20 to 39, 40 
to 59, 60 to 79, and 80 to 339 and 340 plus. 
44 Setting the threshold for the U5MR at 80 per thousand live births perhaps is on the high side. If it is assumed that 
a poor country is defined as being what Milanovic (2005) calls a Fourth World country then, based on this definition, 
there were seventeen countries that were poor both in 1978 as well as in 2000.  The average U5MR for this group 
of seventeen poor countries was approximately 60 deaths per thousand live births in the 1980s.  (This calculation is 
based on information provided in Milanovic (2005: 66 – 68) and Ahmad, Lopez and Inoue (2000).) It would seem, 
therefore, that this level of the U5MR is a reasonable measure of the threshold for min H.  Applying this mortality 
rate as the threshold for the U5MR would only tend to accentuate the bimodal nature of the distribution represented 
by the histogram set out in Chart 4.1 in the main text.  This matter of determining the range within which the 
threshold level of the U5MR lies is discussed further in Section 7 the main text. 
45 The respective ranges for the TMR distribution are: 0 to 7.0 per thousand, 8 to 10, 11 to 13, 14 to 16 and 
17 to 29 and 30 plus. 
46 The ranges of values are 2 to 2.9, 3 to 3.9, etc up 9 to 9.9, and 10 plus.     46
by the histogram in Chart 4.3 implies that in most countries of the world in the early 
1980s there was a comparatively high risk of the repudiation of contracts by the 
governments for the countries concerned. 
  
Chart 4.3 comes about here.   
       
This empirical information, regarding the bimodal distributions across 
countries for these respective measures of health and institutions in the early 
1980s, next is combined with the theoretical argument, represented in Figure 4.1, 
based on the modified Solow-Swan growth model.  Specifically, that argument 
implies that if the distributions of health and/or institutions are bimodal across 
countries, with low-health and/or low-institutions countries being found below the 
health-institutions threshold level and the high-health-high-institutions countries 
being located above this threshold, then the distribution of GDPPC across 
countries also should be bimodal in the late 20
th century.   
This prediction, based on the modified Solow-Swan growth model is 
confirmed by the relevant empirical information for the late 20
th century.  A number 
of authors have calculated or observed that the distribution of GDPPC across 
countries at that time was bimodal.
47 48  For instance this distribution was bimodal 
                                  
47 See Bianchi (1997), Quah (1997), Paap and van Dijk (1998), Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003), Anderson 
(2004), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: 7 – 8), Milanovic (2005: 51 – 3), Durlauf Johnson and Temple. (2005: 593 – 
595) and Edward (2006: 1675). 
48 Usually in the calculations of these distributions country per capita income levels are normalized by the world 
average per capita income.  Some of these calculations also take account of the distribution of personal or 
household incomes within countries.     47
in 1978 and 2000 respectively.
49  This bimodal distribution, in turn, suggests – 
drawing on the argument based on Figure 4.1 - that there were at least two 
dominant equilibria present amongst the national economies for the countries of 
the world in the late 20
th century.  The one equilibrium was at the low-health-low-
institutions capital-labor ratio and the other is at the high-health-high-institutions 
capital-labor ratio.
50
These bimodal distributions of health and institutions respectively (as defined 
here) appear, therefore, to go some way toward explaining the bimodal distribution 
of GDPPC across countries in the late 20
th century.  It is emphasized, however, 
that certain alternative hypotheses have been devised in the attempt to explain this 
bimodal distribution.
51  To my knowledge, however, the only authors who have also 
made an explicit theoretical connection between some measure of the distribution 
of countries across levels of health and the distribution of countries across per 
capita income levels are Galor and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) and Mayer-Foulkes 
(2002, 2005).
52  As noted earlier, however, these authors do not allow for the 
influence of economic institutions.  
                                  
49 See Milanovic (2005: 51 – 3). 
50 By 2001, however, the information provided by Edward (2006: 1675) indicates that the world distribution, that also 
takes account of the distribution of personal incomes within countries, had become trimodal.  (This trimodal 
distribution is also suggested in Sala-i-Martina (2006: 369).)  This change from a bimodal to trimodal distribution was 
due solely to the influence of China as its real per capita, for its relatively large population, grew at a remarkably high 
rate compared to previous world historical experience.  Expressed in terms of the argument associated with Figure 
4.1 in the main text, China from about 1980 up to the early 2000s began to move up the curve marked fg that 
represents the capital-accumulation function that faces countries that have surmounted the fundamental constraint.  
This change, for such a relative large population, caused the world distribution to become trimodal.  Once China is 
removed from this world distribution the resulting distribution, as Edward (2006: 1676) points out, reverts back to 
becoming bimodal.  
51 Quah (1997), for instance, hypothesized that the bimodal distribution of per capita income across 
countries could be generated by a Markov stochastic process.  A survey of the relevant literature is provided 
by Durlauf Johnson and Temple. (2005, section 4 (iii)).   
52 This connection also is an implication of the argument developed in Chakraborty (2004) and Chakraborty, 
Papageorgiou and Sebastián (2005).  None of these authors, however, have also taken into consideration the 
bimodal distribution of institutions across countries.     48
This line of argument may need to be qualified, however, in a number of 
ways.  First it only considers the direction of causation going from the levels of 
health and institutions for a country through to the level of per capita income for 
this country.  Since some of the causation may go in the opposite direction, it might 
be argued that the empirical evidence presented earlier does not necessarily 
substantiate the prediction derived from the theory represented in Figure 4.1.   
The relative importance of this reverse causation can be mitigated, however, 
if cross-country bimodal distributions of pre-determined measures of health and 
institutions respectively for a given year are compared with the cross-country 
distribution of GDPPC for a significantly later year.  Indeed such a comparison 
essentially was provided by the data presented earlier.  As was noted previously, 
the bimodal distributions for health and institutions respectively, which were 
represented in Charts 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, were created by using relevant data for the 
early 1980s.  These distributions, in turn, were compared with the cross-country 
distribution of GDPPC for, say, 2000 – a significantly later year.  And, as was noted 
earlier, the distribution for that year was bimodal – as the theory predicts.   
A more important qualification of the argument presented earlier is that a 
range of other factors, besides just the deep determinants of health and institutions 
respectively, are likely to have an influence on the level of GDPPC for any given 
country.  This matter is addressed in Section 7.  
4.3 Applying time-series data to test inference drawn from the modified 
Solow-Swan model  
4.3.1 Limited absolute convergence   49
The economic theory represented in Figure 4.1 considered in conjunction with the 
associated empirical evidence cited earlier in sub-Section 4.2 allows the tentative 
inference to be drawn that there would have been comparatively little absolute 
convergence between countries in the latter part of the 20
th century.  Indeed this 
evidence provides at least a partial explanation for a fact cited in the introduction – 
which was that out of some 100 non-rich countries in 1960 only seven were 
successful at experiencing some absolute convergence over the period 1960 
through to 2000.   
These ‘converging countries’ are considered in more detail later in this sub-
section.   
4.3.2 Convergence processes  
There are a number of possible routes that allow absolute convergence – or 
types of economic development - between the low-health-low-institutions steady 
state (marked by point d in Figure 4.1) and the high-health-high-institutions steady 
state (marked as point g).  One of these convergence paths is represented in 
Figure 4.1.   
4.3.2.1 Improvement in institutions initially below min I and health above min 
H 
At the initial point d in Figure 4.1 it is assumed that the level of health is above 
min H and that the level of economic institutions is below min I.  Next it is assumed 
that, for one reason or another, there is a marked improvement in the level of the 
quality of economic institutions.  This change should encourage, at least initially   50
higher rates of savings and technology change and an increase in the level of 
economic efficiency.  This allows the capital-accumulation function to rise from 
 to the threshold level,  , represented in Figure 
4.1.  It also is assumed that over this initial change in economic states the level of 
health does not alter in size.  (This may not be the case, however, due to the 
possible presence of the amplification effect discussed in sub-Section 3.4.)  This 
implies that the rate of growth of the labor force is likely to remain unchanged – at 
least for the present.  It follows that the economy moves from point d to point e in 
Figure 4.1. 
PP P P P {[s A f (k )]/k }
T
PP P P P {[s A f (k )]/k }
This economy now is at a steady state at the threshold level of the capital-
labor ratio.  From this platform, where the basic constraint is just satisfied, this 
economy is in a position to launch into experiencing significantly higher rates of 
savings, higher levels of technical and economic efficiency that allows the 
development of a modern economic sector.  Hence the rate of growth of GDPPC 
rises significantly, at least initially, as this economy moves from point e towards 
point f in Figure 4.1.  The economy next moves off along the capital-accumulation 
function marked,   (viz. the capital-accumulation function to be 
found in the rich country).  If there are no economic shocks to disrupt the resulting 
convergence process, this country eventually will reach the level of the steady-
state capital/labor ratio for the rich country.
RR R R R {[s A f (k )]/k }
53  During this adjustment process the 
rate of growth of population, and hence the labor force also declines. 
                                  
53 A topic not discussed in the main text is what will occur to a country that has managed to 
surmount the basic constraint and begins on the process of converging on the rich countries, but   51
Possibly Botswana came nearest to (although not exactly) following the initial 
stages of the convergence path that has just been outlined.  As pointed out by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003), improvements in the level of the 
economic institutions in this country facilitated the exploitation of the diamond 
deposits to be found in this country.  These changes, in turn, allowed the average 
rate of growth of GDPPC for this country to be about 9.5 per cent per annum 
during the 1970s and 80s.  These improvements probably also contributed to the 
simultaneous improvement in the level of health that attained the minimum level 
required by the mid-1980s.  (The U5MR was 84 deaths per thousand live births in 
1980 and reached 65 by the 1985.  The minimum or threshold level required for 
the U5MR probably is somewhere within the range 60 and 80 death per thousand 
live births.)
54
4.3.2.2 Initial increase in health followed by an increase in institutions
55  
The available relevant historical evidence suggests, however, that the more 
common initial conditions and sequence of subsequent changes that leads to 
some absolute convergence is the following: (i) the level health and economic 
institutions are both below their respective threshold levels. (ii) In the initial phase 
                                                                                                    
then its economy experiences a severe negative shock of some kind.  Presumably the 
consequence is that this country now experiences absolute divergence.  This not unimportant 
matter is discussed in Martina (2007).  
54 The spread of HIV/AIDS amongst the population of Botswana in the 1990s and later suggests, however, that this 
epidemic may have diminished this country’s rate of growth of GDPPC.  This is indicated by the facts that by 2003 
the U5MR in this country had risen to 112 per thousand live births – well above the level for min H (as tentatively 
defined in the main text) - while the rate of growth of GDDPC fell appreciably to around 2.7 per cent per annum in 
the 1990s and to around 5 per cent per annum in the early 2000s.  (All the data cited here is taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators (2006).) Naturally other forces may also have been at work – such as possibly the 
lack of success in discovering rich deposits of minerals during this period – to cause this decline in the rate of 
economic growth.  The general results reported in McDonald and Roberts (2006) of the influence of the HIV/AIDs 
pandemic on the rate of economic growth for representative countries also is of relevance here.   
55 This important particular case is discussed in far more detail in Martina (2007) within the context of a 
variation of modified Solow-Swan model represented in Figure 4.1 in the main text.    52
there is a marked improvement in the level of health up to the threshold level while 
the level of institutions remains unchanged (or more of less so).  (iii) Only after the 
health threshold has been attained does the country concerned attempt to embark 
in earnest on improving the level of institutions.  (iv) Once this last step has been 
taken then, and only then, is the economy in a position to experience a period of 
comparatively rapid and sustained growth of GDPPC.  (v) The rate of growth of 
population declines during phases (ii) and (iii) and beyond. 
To demonstrate these assertions use is made of the relevant parts of the 
recent economic history for the developing countries referred to in the introduction 
(excluding Botswana that already has been dealt with) that experienced some 
absolute convergence from about 1960 up to 2000 and beyond.  To begin with 
consider the relevant economic facts with regard to Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Egypt – all countries that have experienced some absolute convergence.  In each 
country malaria was first brought under control in the early to mid-20
th  century
 
before each of these countries experienced some economic development in the 
1960s and beyond.  Singapore benefited from the application of the techniques for 
controlling malaria pioneered in Malaya (which became Malaysia in 1957) between 
1901 and the late 1920s.  A similar program for controlling malaria was 
implemented in Hong Kong between 1901 and 1905.
56  Between 1942 and 1945 
there also was a successful campaign mounted in Egypt to control Anopheles 
gambiae.
57  Once the level of health had been raised in each of these countries in 
the vicinity of the threshold level, or above this level, it now was a matter of placing 
                                  
56  See Keiser Singer and Utzinger (2005: 699). 
57 See Shousha (1948).     53
greater emphasis on raising the level of economic institutions up to and above 
some minimum level required for sustained economic development to take place.
58 
59  
This line of argument is given more detailed support by the information 
presented in Table 4.1 for the countries cited there (viz. China, Malaysia, South 
Korea and Vietnam) – information that essentially was generated, unintentionally, 
by quasi-controlled experiments.
60 
61 As can be seen in that table each of these 
countries went from experiencing comparatively low, to attaining comparatively 
high average rates of growth of GDPPC per annum over comparatively short 
periods of time.  (The absolute size of the difference in these two average growth 
rates was no less than 2.5 percentage points in the instance of Malaysia, and 
reached around 6.0 percentage points in the case of China.) 
 
Table 4.1 comes about here 
 
Also indicated in Table 4.1 is the fact that in the instance of each of these 
countries there was a fall - in some cases a substantial fall - in the U5MR to no 
                                  
58 Egypt probably is the exception to the argument just set out in the main text.  In this instance the analysis 
based on Figure 4.2 (instead of Figure 4.1) probably applies.  This country probably moved from a steady 
state where the health-only poverty trap applied prior to 1990, to a steady state where the health-cum-
institutions poverty trap began to apply in the mid-1990s.  The basis for these statements is that Egypt, as 
late as 1990 had a U5MR of 104 per thousand live births.  However, this measure of health fell to 71 by 
1995 – a level within the bounds of threshold level of health for the health-cum-institutions poverty trap. 
59 With respect to Hong Kong there was, however, the confounding influence of China from 1949 on.  This is 
so since Hong Kong was an entrepôt for China up to at least 1979 – a fact that would have been of 
considerable economic benefit for Hong Kong.   
60 This is so since the information set out in Table 4.1 covers comparatively short episodes of economic 
develop, while during each episode a single deep determinant altered in size while the other relevant deep 
determinants appear to have remained more of less unchanged. 
61 Taiwan, which should be included in the list of countries just cited in the main text, is omitted because of 
the lack of relevant empirical information for this country.   54
greater than 75 per thousand live births before a concerted attempt was made to 
improve the quality of economic institutions and before the significant rise in the 
average rate of growth of GDPPC.  More precisely, each of these countries 
probably had attained min H before attention turned to improving the quality of 
economic institutions and before the significant and sustained rise in the average 
rate of growth of GDPPC.   
As for the timing of the particular broad attempts to improve the quality of 
economic institutions, the relevant facts for China were sketched out earlier in sub-
Section 2.3.  A similar sequence of changes took place Vietnam.  Only after 
reaching the threshold level of health by the mid-1980s did this country embarked 
on a process of reforming its economic institutions in 1986 – a reform program 
called Doi Moi (renovation).
62  The resulting improvement in the quality of 
economic institutions appears to have contributed to stimulating a significantly 
sharp rise in the level of savings as a share of GDP that, in turn, contributed to a 
marked increase in the rate of growth of GDPPC.  (Also associated with this 
change probably was a significant increase in the rate of growth of total factor 
productivity.) 
Similarly in the instance of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) this country 
navigated the course of first increasing the level of health up to the threshold level 
followed by an increase in the level of institutions.
63  In this instance, however, the 
marked improvement in the level of health probably would have induced an 
                                  
62 A list of institutional and other reforms from 1986 up to 2002 is to be found in Van Arkadie and Mallon 
(2004).   
63 A discussion of the evolution of the legal system in South Korea and Malaysia respectively is to be found 
in Pistor and Wellons (1998, especially Chs 3 and 4).   55
increase in the level of education that, in turn, probably would have facilitated an 
improvement in quality of economic institutions.  To explain, first there was a sharp 
reduction in the U5MR between 1961 - 65 and 1966 - 79.  Since this change would 
have tended to increase the expected rate of return on investments in the 
education of children, it is not surprising to find that there was an associated 
increase in the average number of years of schooling.  (The average number of 
years of schooling for those 15 years of age and above rose by 72 per cent 
between 1960 and 1980 - from 5.08 years to 8.74 years.
64)  Next, as noted earlier 
in sub-Section 3.3, Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that this rise in the level of 
education would have facilitated an increase in the level of the quality of economic 
institutions during this period.  It was during these changes, of improved levels of 
education and the associated improvements in the level of institutions, that South 
Korea experienced a sharp increase in the level of savings as a share of GDP (and 
probably a marked increase in the level of total factor productivity as well).   
Consequently there was a comparatively large increase in the rate of growth of 
GDPPC over a sustained period of time. 
A similar sequence of changes took place in Malaysia from about 1960 on.  
We know from the discussion in sub-Section 2.1 that there had been an 
improvement in the level of health beginning in Malaya in the 1900s and 1910s that 
flowed through to Malaysia of the 1960s.  In the 1960s, however, there was social 
instability in that country that erupted into widespread riots in May 1969.  Hence 
economic institutions in that country at around that year would have been below 
                                  
64 The data on schooling is taken from Cohen and Soto (2007).      56
the minimum required to facilitate sustained economic development.  In the 
attempt to address the grievances that sparked these riots the New Economic 
Policy was promulgated in 1971 and implemented thereafter.  This implementation 
process presumably, in turn, would have been assisted by the marked 
improvement in the level of education during this period.  (The average number of 
years of schooling for those 15 years of age and above rose by 90 per cent 
between 1960 and 1980 - from 3.13 years to 5.95 years.
65)  However, this marked 
improvement in the level of education would have been facilitated by the continued 
reduction in the U5MR in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Finally, these various 
changes together appear to have combined to encourage both higher levels of 
savings as a share of GDP (as indicated in Table 4.1) and increased levels of 
foreign investment.  (No doubt the level of total factor productivity also increased 
significantly during these changes.)  Again a consequence was the significant 
sustained increase in the rate of growth of GDPPC.   
It also is noted that, in the instance of each of the countries listed in Table 4.1, 
as the level of health improved (viz. the U5MR decreased) in the initial stages of 
the convergence process (up to and past the threshold) so the rate of growth of 
population declined.  This is just what was indicated in sub-Section 3.2 would tend 
to occur when the level of health improved within the context of improving 
economic circumstances – circumstances that can best be taken advantage of if 
the labor force has an appropriate level and range of skills.
66
                                  
65 The data on schooling is taken from Cohen and Soto (2007). 
66 This theme is developed in some detail in Martina (1996).    57
To conclude this sub-section it is emphasized that an implication of the 
previous discussion, based on the modified Solow-Swan growth model set out 
earlier and the quasi-controlled experimental data set out in Table 4.1, is that each 
of the countries listed in that table initially would have found themselves faced with 
a health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  Only after each of these countries found 
ways to raise their respective levels of health and economic institutions at least up 
to the respective threshold levels required did they experience sustained economic 
development.  An alternative way of constructing tests, to determine if the health-
cum-institutions poverty trap exists, is set out in the next section. 
5 Constructing a more detailed framework to test of versions of the poverty-
trap hypothesis  
While the discussion in the previous section provides some limited evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that health-cum-institutions poverty trap exists, the 
theory set out in Section 3 and early in Section 4 both indicate that it should be 
possible to design a framework that would allow additional empirical tests of this 
hypothesis – above all tests that make use of econometric analysis.  The initial 
parts of this framework are presented here.     
To set the scene it is noted that the previous discussion based on Figure 3.1 
indicated that there are possibly two types of poverty traps.  There is the health-
only poverty trap that applies in countries that experience relatively extremely low 
levels of health such that economic institutions have no influence in moving the 
economy towards the beginnings of the creation of a modern sector in the 
economies for these countries.  In contrast, in countries which have reached a   58
higher level of health, but still below the threshold level, now economic institutions 
may begin to have some influence on the creation of a modern sector.  In these 
countries it is hypothesized that the health-cum-institutions poverty trap applies.  
Each of these poverty traps are considered here.  
5.1 The framework for testing the health-cum-institutions poverty trap  
The theory based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1 indicates that in a country with the 
level of health below min H and the level of institutions below min I, a 
complementarity-cum-amplification (hereon called a complementarity) effect 
should operate between these two deep determinants.  While this effect is 
operating in the economy for this country the theory indicates that it will tend to be 
trapped in a health-cum-institutions poverty.  It also was pointed out within the 
context of Figure 3.1 that in a country with comparatively high levels of health (so 
that at least H > min H) and institutions (so that at least I > min I) respectively, such 
that the fundamental constraint has been surmounted, the strict version of the 
complementarity effect is likely to be absent from this country’s economy.  Rather 
in this high-health-high-institutions economy, health and institutions can be 
substituted for one another to a reasonable high degree in order to create some 
combination of these deep determinants that is required to achieve a given level of 
GDPPC.  (This reasonable supposition was represented earlier in Figure 3.1.)  It 
follows from this line of argument that an initial test of the health-cum-institutions 
poverty-trap hypothesis may take the form of testing if the complementarity effect 
is present in certain relevant regression; viz. models that are concerned with 
countries that are at a certain phase in their economic development.   59
Later this test will be applied by, to begin with, making use of a (full) cross-
country data set for countries from a wide range of levels of health.  The use of this 
data set, however, suffers from a weakness; viz. it does not explicitly test if the 
complementarity effect is to be found in, at least, low-health countries.  To 
overcome this weakness it needs to be determined if the complementarity effect is 
present in countries with reasonably low levels of health, and is absent in countries 
that have attained comparatively high levels of health and institutions.  If the 
econometric evidence indicates that this is the case then the theory based on 
Figures 3.1 and 4.1 suggests that low-health countries are trapped in poverty in the 
sense that they have been unable to surmount the fundamental constraint.  In 
contrast, the absence of the complementarity effect in the high-health-high-
institutions countries suggests that these countries have escaped this trap by being 
able to surmount this constraint.   
This statistical test unfortunately places comparatively heavy demands on the 
cross-country data set that is available.  This is so since the full data set has to be 
partitioned into comparatively small sub-sets in order to estimate the relevant 
regression models for appropriate groups of countries.  An alternative test of the 
theory can be devised, however, that makes use of the full data set.  Specifically 
the theory based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1 indicates that the complementarity effect 
will tend to be found, or is concentrated in the low-health-low-institutions countries.  
Put differently, this complementarity effect should be present only in an outlying 
group of countries.  If this is so then it follows that if, in the process of estimating 
appropriate regression models by applying the full data set, allowance is made for   60
the possible presence of outliers, the coefficient estimate for the complementarity 
effect should be statistically insignificant.  In contrast, when no allowance is made 
for outliers the coefficient estimate for the complementarity effect should be 
statistically significant.  
These various tests of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap are applied in 
Section 7.  While each test presented in that section, when considered in isolation, 
may not be considered to be particularly strong, each test does act as a cross-
check on the other tests.  What is more this group of tests needs to be assessed in 
combination with the evidence provided in the previous section and the quasi-
controlled experimental evidence presented earlier in Section 2.  Hence these 
various should be considered in combination – not singly or in isolation.  Such an 
assessment is provided in section 7. 
5.2 The framework for testing the health-only poverty trap  
Earlier it was argued, within the context of discussing the theory represented 
in Figure 3.1 that in countries that have relatively extremely low levels health the 
complementarity effect may be absent.  If this is so then these countries are faced 
with an extreme, or deeper form of the poverty trap; viz. the health-only poverty 
trap.  To provide a test of this conjecture those countries that have comparatively 
extremely low levels of health need to be compared with countries that have 
attained higher levels of health.  In the former group of countries it needs to be 
determined if (i) the level of economic institutions has no, and (ii) the level of health 
has some influence on determining the level of GDPPC for these countries.  In 
countries that have attained higher levels of health, it needs to be determined if   61
both deep determinants have a rôle to play in determining the level of GDPPC for 
these countries.  Again this form of testing is applied in Section 7. 
5.3 The non-linearity issue 
One way of interpreting this framework for testing of the health-cum-
institutions and health-only poverty traps is that reasonably detailed allowance has 
been made in the testing procedure for the possible presence of non-linearities and 
discontinuities in the economic system in which the fundamental constraint applies 
over certain ranges of the deep determinants.
67  (These non-linearities and 
discontinuities are represented in Figures 3.1 and 4.1.)  This matter is returned to 
in sub-Section 7.5.    
6. Some econometric issues 
6.1 The general form of the basic regression model 
The point was made in the sub-Section 4.3.1 that the empirical evidence cited 
there suggested that between 1960 and about 2000 there was little absolute 
convergence between countries during that period.  There is also some reasonably 
strong evidence that suggests that there was little conditional convergence either.
68  
It appears reasonably safe to assume, therefore, that most, but not all countries 
were near, or at their respective steady states towards the end of this period.  For 
this reason it seems preferable to concentrate attention on attempting to explain 
                                  
67 The need to allow explicitly for non-linearities and discontinuities also has been emphasized by 
Durlauf (2003) within the context of testing for economic convergence.   
68 In what possibly has been the most careful estimation to date of empirical growth models making use of 
cross-country data, Hoover and Perez (2004, pp. 791 - 2) found that for the average country there was no 
statistically significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that conditional convergence had taken place 
over the period 1960 through to 1992.  Some reliance can be placed on this result since Hoover and Perez 
employed the research methodology of carefully reducing a relevant general unrestricted regression model 
down to a specific model.  This methodology is discussed later in the main text.     62
the variation in the level of the logarithm Log GDPPC across countries in 1995 - 
rather than the variation in the average rate of growth of this variable across 
countries over the period 1960 through to 2000.
69   
The general form of the regression model to be estimated is: 
      ii i i Log GDPPC =β Z+ ε , i,     (6.1) ∀
where   is a vector of regression coefficients to be estimated, Z i β i denotes the 
vector of the set of regressors for country i and   is the error term for this country.    i ε
The list of deep determinants that are included in Zi  in (6.1) in various 
combinations is to be found in Table 6.1.  The definitions and summary statistics 
for these regressors are set out there.   
 
Table 6.1 comes about here 
 
That part of the discussion in Section 3 concerned with indicating the 
channels along which the level of health may influence an economy implies that 
the risk of contracting malaria is an incomplete measure of health.  Rather this risk 
(in 1994) and the child or adult or total mortality rate (all for the early 1980s) are 
                                  
69 The year 1995 is chosen for consideration in order to limit the influence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic afflicting 
sub-Saharan countries on the empirical analysis, bearing in mind the limitations imposed by what relevant data 
sets are available at or before 1995.  Had a later year been adopted - say 2000 - in any relevant empirical 
analysis this pandemic probably would have a marked influence (after controlling for other considerations) on 
the level of Log GDDPC across countries in that year.  Consequently such an empirical analysis would provide 
few interesting insights.  In the attempt to generate more useful results, therefore, the empirical analysis that 
follows in the main text is directed at attempting to determine (after controlling for other relevant 
considerations) the influence of the general level of health before the HIV/AIDS pandemic is likely to have had 
any major confounding impact on the level of Log GDDPC across countries.   63
employed in an overall measure of health.
70  The measure of economic institutions 
employed is either the rule of law, or the risk of repudiation of contracts by 
government, or the risk or expropriation of private property (all for the early 1980s).  
The reasons why predetermined or lagged measures of these regressors are 
applied in (6.1) are discussed later. 
To capture the complementarity-cum-amplification effect (discussed earlier in 
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5) between the level of health and the level of institutions, 
some appropriate measure of institutions is multiplied by the inverse of a measure 
of some appropriate mortality rate.  As for the rest of the regressors employed in 
(6.1), they are listed in Table 6.1 and are numbered 10 to 20.  The reasons for 
including these additional regressors in (6.1) are considered next. 
6.2 Econometric issues 
6.2.1 Attempting to identify the true regression model   
It is uncertain what regressors, other than measures of health and institutions 
should be included in (6.1).  This is indicated by the fact that a multitude of 
variables have been used as regressors in various studies that have attempted to 
estimate various economic growth models.
71
To assist with the task of attempting to identify the ‘true’ regression model 
initially use is made of the findings reported in Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and 
Miller (2004) and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 557 – 8).  There a version 
                                  
70 Combinations of the alternative mortality rates were not used because of the high level of correlation 
between these variables.  The respective simple correlation coefficients are: 0.8567 (child on adult 
mortality); 0.9102 (child on total mortality) and 0.8778 (adult on total mortality).   
71 Some 67 regressors are listed in Sala-i-Martin, Dopplehofer and Miller (2004) and in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004, pp. 557 – 8), and 145 regressors in Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005).   64
of Bayesian averaging techniques was applied to determine which regressors are 
the most robust in a model concerned with explaining cross-county rates of growth 
of GDPPC.
72  In particular, these results suggest a list of regressors that could be 
regarded as some of the deep determinants that possibly should be included, at 
least initially, as regressors in (6.1).   
Of the most robust variables listed in Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller 
(2004, Table 3) six are selected (viz. regressors 10 to 15 in Table 6.1).  To this list 
are added alternative measures of openness to international trade,
73 ethnic and 
linguistic fractionalism
74 and the mean annual temperature in 1987.  This latter 
regressor is allowed for in order to provide an additional dimension of geography.  
Finally a dummy variable is used to identify if a country is, or is not an ex-colony.   
Even after having selected this truncated set of regressors there is still the 
problem of attempting to identify the ‘true’ form of the regression model.  In the 
attempt to overcome this difficulty regressors are eliminated gradually from some 
general unrestricted regression model by applying a variation of the methodology 
set out in Hoover and Perez (2004) and Hendry and Krolzig (2004, 2005: C34 – 
35) – a methodology concerned with traversing from the general unrestricted, to 
the specific regression model.
75 This general-to-specific (GTS) methodology 
recommends itself since Hoover and Perez (2004: 776 - 8) have demonstrated, 
within the context of estimating economic growth models and through the 
                                  
72 A variation of this Bayesian averaging approach also is applied by Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2005).   
73 This variable was applied in the study by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). 
74 These two variables have been emphasized by Tan (2005) in a comparable study. 
75 Details of the GTS methodology applied in the main text are provided in Appendix A.  The most 
important step in applying this GTS methodology is step one for if the initial general unrestricted 
model is poorly specified there is little or no chance that the true model will be derived from the 
unrestricted model.     65
application of Monte Carlo experiments, that this approach is relatively successful 
(compared to the use of alternative comparable methodologies) at reducing the 
risk of committing Type I error - including regressors that should be excluded from 
the true model - and Type II error - excluding regressors that should be included in 
the true model.  Indeed in the Hoover-Perez study application of this general-to-
specific procedure had a remarkably high success rate (near to 100 per cent) in 
identifying the true model.
 76  
Application of this methodology allows the data to identify what specific 
regression model(s) best fits (fit) the data.  Applying this methodology means that 
the data is not manipulated, by imposing a specific regression model, to fit the 
economic theory.  (If such a questionable approach had been taken this would be 
an instance of ‘data mining’.)  In addition applying this methodology should help to 
limit the risk of omitting relevant and important regressors that should appear in 
this specific model.   
6.2.2 The endogeneity issue  
Endogeneity is likely to be present in the estimation of (6.1) if all regressors, 
employed to estimate that regression equation, are not predetermined or lagged to 
an adequate degree.  In these circumstances the standard way to handle this 
problem would be to apply instrumental variables (IVs) that possess the required 
properties.  Unfortunately, as Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005: 638) have 
                                  
76  The GTS methodology also has been employed, within the context of estimating economic growth 
regression models, by Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002).   66
emphasized, there is no certainty that the IVs that have been applied in the 
empirical growth literature possess the desired properties.  Specifically they state: 
‘In our view, the belief that it is easy to identify valid instrumental variables in 
the growth context is deeply mistaken.  We regard many applications of 
instrumental variable procedures in the empirical growth literature to be 
undermined by the failure to address properly the question of whether these 
instruments are valid.’  
This observation is taken into account in the empirical analysis presented 
here.  Without going into details, it is not difficult to construct an argument that 
warns against the use of IVs (at least those that are available) in the estimation of 
versions of (6.1).
77 
78  Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to assert that the 
potential endogeneity problem associated with attempting to estimate the true form 
of (6.1) needs to be mitigated in some way.  The approach adopted here is to 
apply, where necessary and if possible, predetermined regressors with relatively 
long lags in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of various versions of (6.1).  
Certainly this estimation strategy is suggested by the discussions in sub-Sections 
2.1 and 2.3 and sub-Section 4.3.2.2 where, in each historical episode cited there, 
marked changes in the level of health, or the level of institutions, or both, preceded 
any subsequent major changes in the level of economic activity.   
                                  
77 It is likely that endogeneity, omitted variables and errors in the variables are present, simultaneously, in 
the regression equation to be estimated.  It also is possible that these considerations offset one another to 
some degree.  If so it might be inappropriate to apply IVs in this instance. 
78 A survey of recent developments regarding the appropriate applications of IVs is provided by Murray 
(2006).   67
Similar observations can be inferred from the historical information presented 
by Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006, pp. 22 -3), Arora (2005, pp. 219 - 224) 
and Galor (2005a, 185 – 9) with regard to changes in the level of health on 
subsequent marked changes in the level of GDPPC.  In each instance considered 
(covering a range of countries over various periods of time) a significant fall in 
some relevant mortality rate was followed by a marked increase in the level of 
GDPPC – presuming that institutions already had attained some threshold 
minimum level.  After consulting a range of relevant empirical information Soares 
(2005: 596) came to a similar conclusion; viz. ‘...that the changes in the level of 
mortality observed in developing countries…were exogenous to these countries.’  
Indeed what appears to have been far more important, than any increase in the 
level of GDPPC in a developing country, for inducing a rise in the level of health in 
this country was the availability of new (or not so new) significant medical 
knowledge that allowed this country to raise its level of health at comparatively little 
cost.  (By implication the historical quasi-controlled experiments cited in sub-
Section 2.1 demonstrated this point.)   
Based on these various remarks it seems reasonable to apply as regressors 
predetermined values of relevant measures of mortality rates and institutions.  This 
application is based on the reasonable assumption that there is no correlation 
between either of these predetermined regressors and the error term in some 
relevant version of (6.1) - viz. for example E(z1980ε1995) = 0, where E is the 
expectations operator and z1980  is a predetermined measure of some relevant 
mortality rate or economic institution for 1980.   68
While predetermined variables are used as measures for mortality and 
institutions respectively, it is not possible to find an acceptable predetermined 
measure for the risk of malaria.  This is not necessarily a serious statistical 
problem, however, since there is medical evidence to suggest that in the late 20
th 
century prior to 1995 a marginal rise in the GDPPC, in a country where 
plasmodium falciparum was prevalent, had little impact on reducing the incidence 
of malaria in this country.  Part of the explanation for this situation is that, to cite 
one recent assessment by Kleinschmidt et al. (2006: 976) of an anti-malaria 
program in a community where this type of malaria was prevalent: ‘At high 
transmission intensity [as measured by the EIR], prevalence of infection is more or 
less insensitive to moderate changes in transmission intensity.  Only once 
transmission intensity … is reduced below a threshold value will there be a 
corresponding reduction in prevalence.’  This observation implies that marginal 
changes in the level of GDPPC are unlikely to have a significant influence on the 
level of malaria in a community where plasmodium falciparum is pervasive.
79   
This last point is given added weight by the fact that the relevant Anopholes 
mosquitoes, which are the vector for carrying plasmodium falciparum, by the early 
1990s had built up resistance to the chemical sprays applied.  As for the treatment 
of malaria, what relevant drugs were available at the time (in the decade prior to 
1995) the plasmodium falciparum parasite also had built up some resistance to 
these drugs.
80 
81  Overall, therefore, in the early 1990s marginal changes in the 
                                  
79 A non-linear (concave) relationship between GDPPC and the under-five child mortality rate due to 
plasmodium falciparum also is hinted at in Snow et al. (2004: 19).   
80 See Attaran et al. (2006: 250) and the references cited there.   69
level of national income, in a country where plasmodium falciparum was prevalent, 
were unlikely to have had any significant impact on reducing the incidence of 
malaria in this country.  Indeed there is evidence to indicate that, even as early as 
the mid-1970s, in communities where there were non-marginal increases in the 
level of resources expended on controlling malaria there was little reduction in the 
prevalence of this disease.
82  In general the problem here was the lack of new and 
effective medical knowledge that would allow malaria to be controlled. 
The only instances (prior to 1995) where anti-malaria programs were effective 
were in those areas of the world on the temperate margin of the tropical areas 
where malaria is seasonal and where plasmodium falciparum was not so 
prevalent.  In these circumstances well-funded and carefully implemented anti-
malaria programs did have a long-lasting impact on drastically reducing the 
incidence of malaria in the countries concerned.  But this reduction occurred prior 
to the period of interest here; viz. the early 1980s through to 1995.
83   
An implication that follows from these observations is that the use of a 
suitable measure of the level of malaria by country for 1994 in the estimation of 
(6.1) is unlikely to create a significant endogeneity problem in an ordinary least 
squares estimation of that regression equation.  For the sake of completeness, 
however, later, when carrying out robustness tests of the initial estimations of 
                                                                                                    
81 By the early twenty-first century (but not before), however, artemisinin-based drugs in combination with 
other drugs were proving to be effective in the treatment of malaria, albeit at a relatively high cost compared 
to previous treatments of malaria caused by plasmodium falciparum. See Attaran et al. (2006: 250) and the 
references cited there. 
82 See the assessment by Goriup and Pull (1988) of the Garki Project (in northern Nigeria) in the early to 
mid-1970s.  This anti-malaria project was comparatively well funded and yet there was no marked reduction 
in the incidence of malaria in the region concerned.  
83 See Section 2, Bruce-Chwatt and de Zuletta (1980), Grammiccia and Beales (1988), Gallup and Sachs 
(2001: 88 – 90) and the references cited there, Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) and Amorosa Jr., Corbellini and 
Coluzzi (2005).   70
versions of (6.1), a suitable IV for the measure of malaria will be used to re-
estimate relevant initial regression equations.
84  
7. A range of regression results 
7.1 The basic results and their interpretation 
The most satisfactory OLS regression equation results, derived by applying 
the GTS methodology, are presented in Table 7.1.  (To save on space the constant 
terms are omitted in all tables in which estimates of regression equations are 
presented.)  All the results presented there are robust in the sense that each was 
derived from some general comparatively unrestricted regression equation (for 
some given measure of mortality and some given measure of institutions) that 
reduced to some specific regression model in which all the coefficient estimates 
are statistically significant (according to the standard tests of significance) and 
possess the expected sign.  As indicted in the previous section, in order to avoid 
the multicollinearity problem this exercise was repeated in turn for each measure of 
the mortality rate (child, adult and total mortality respectively) in combination with 
one of the three measures of institutions for the early 1980s.  (All versions of the 
general model were based on combinations of the regressors 2 to 20 listed in 
Table 6.1.  A maximum of 13 of these regressors were applied in any version of 
                                  
84 Despite the argument set out in the main text some may still insist that suitable IVs should be applied in the 
estimation of relevant regression models.  In response it is noted that in two related studies (Batten and 
Martina (2007), and Lorentzen et al. (2005)) it was found, after allowing for the possible presence of the 
endogeneity of institutions and/or health by the applications of suitable IVs (within a two-stage least squares 
estimation model), that the coefficient estimates for institutions and/or health were biased away from zero.  
This is contrary to expectations.  (This is also found to be so in the instance of the relevant coefficient 
estimates for malaria presented in sub-Section 7.2.1.)  It follows from these observations that, by not making 
use of IVs, this possibly may bias the estimates of relevant coefficients towards zero and, hence, against the 
thesis that institutions and health statistically significant in determining the level of GDPPC in the 
representative country.  The possible presence of this type of bias is perfectly acceptable within the present 
context since we do not want to overstate the importance of health and economic institutions in explaining the 
distribution of GDPPC across countries in the latter part of the 20
th century.   71
the initial general regression model.)  To save on space, however, all these results 
are not reported here.  What is represented in Table 7.1, as regression equations 
numbered 1 to 4 are the results that provide the best statistical fits – viz. regression 
model estimates that provided the smallest value of the Schwarz Criterion.
85   
In regression equations numbered 1 and 2 the use of the under-five child 
mortality rate (U5MR), as part of the measure of health, provided more satisfactory 
results than those obtained by applying either the adult mortality rate (AMR) or the 
total mortality rate (TMR).  While the results presented in these regression 
equations are satisfactory, that presented in regression equation 2 in Table 7.1 is 
to be preferred.   
 
Table 7.1 comes about here 
 
Neither of these regression equations allows, however, for the 
complementarity effect between health and institutions.  In allowing for this effect it 
is measured by multiplying some relevant measure of institutions by the inverse of 
some appropriate mortality rate.  The most satisfactory regression results 
generated by employing alternative measures of this complementarity effect are 
reported in regression equations numbered 3 and 4 in Table 7.1.  In each of these 
regression equations the coefficient estimates for the complementarity effect have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the various 
                                  
85 The smaller the measure of the Schwarz Criterion the better the statistical fit of the regression equation 
concerned.   72
measures of the Schwarz Criterion set out in Table 7.1 indicate that regression 
equation number 4 is to be preferred over regression equations numbered 1 to 3.  
In regression equation number 4 now the TMR is the most satisfactory measure of 
mortality, while the complementarity effect seems to be captured best by the risk of 
repudiation multiplied by the inverse of the U5MR. 
In the process of deriving regression equations numbered 1 to 4 in Table 
7.1 by applying the GTS methodology naturally a number of regressors included in 
the general model were eliminated from the regression model along the way.  This 
elimination process implies, after allowing for the presence of more statistically 
significant regressors in the regression model, that each of the following regressors 
had no statistically significant rôle to play in determining the variation in the level of 
the logarithm of GDDPC across countries in the later part of the 20
th century: the 
degree of access to and the level of international trade, the mean temperature for a 
country, the level of social fragmentation within a country and whether or not a 
country was an ex-colony.
86   
Returning to regression equation number 4, this equation explains some 90 
per cent of the variation across countries in the level of the logarithm of GDPPC in 
1995.  In addition, the regressors measuring the level of health alone – the levels 
of malaria, the TMR and the TMR squared – have coefficient estimates of the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at the one per cent level according to 
                                  
86 The finding, that whether or not a county is an ex-colony has no influence on the level of the logarithm of 
GDDPC for this country in the latter part 20
th century (after allowing for other considerations), also is to be 
found in Gallup and Sachs (2001: 87).  The issue of the influence of colonialism on the level of GDPPC for a 
representative country at the end of the 20
th Century is discussed in some detail in Martina (2007) – a 
discussion that addresses the sort of issues raised for instance in Mitchener, Weidenmeir and Weidenmeir 
(2005), Ferguson and Schularick (2006) and Coyne and Davies (2007),    73
the two-tailed test.  The measure of economic institutions – the risk of repudiation 
squared – also has a coefficient estimate that is of the expected sign and is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level of significance.  
The last three regressors cited in regression equation 4 in Table 7.1 are the 
dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa and the tropical regions of the world 
(Tropics) respectively, and the proportion of GDP produced in the mining and 
quarrying sectors in about 1988 (Mining).  Not unexpectedly, the sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy and the dummy for the tropics have a negative influence on the level 
of the logarithm of GDPPC.  As for the influence of mining, which has a statistically 
significant positive impact on the level of the logarithm of GDPPC, it could be 
interpreted as measuring the degree of luck a country has in its attempt to develop 
its economy.  Those countries that are lucky enough to have relatively large 
amounts of valuable minerals discovered within their borders will tend to 
experience higher levels of GDPPC – that is after allowing for other relevant 
considerations.
87   
Since the regression equations in Table 7.1 report the fact that the 
complementarity effect is statistically significant at the one percent level, this 
suggests, given the theory set out earlier (based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1 set out in 
                                  
87 Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) have argued that the level of economic institutions would influence the 
degree to which the level of mining in turn would influence the rate of economic growth, and presumably the 
level of GDPPC for the representative country.  In terms of the regression equations set out in Table 7.1, 
however, this institutional effect would be captured to a large degree by the regressor, the risk of repudiation 
of contracts.  However, any indirect influence that economic institutions might have, by operating through 
Mining, seems to be of minor statistically significance. 
To explain the following exercise was performed.  After allowing for a range of regressors when estimating 
relevant regression equations (while applying the GTS methodology), in which Mining was the dependent 
variable, the risk of repudiation was the only regressor to have a statistically significant influence on the level 
of Mining.  (To save on space the relevant regression equation is not reported here.)  However, this 
regressor only explained 6 per cent of the variation in the level of Mining across countries.  This 
comparatively low level of explanation is not surprising since, as indicated in the main text a great deal of 
luck is involved in finding valuable minerals in relative abundance within a country’s borders.     74
Sections 3 and 4 respectively), that the average representative country at the end 
of the 20
th century tended to be confronted by the health-cum-institutions poverty 
trap.  This empirical result is not of itself conclusive, however, since it still needs to 
be demonstrated that this poverty trap was present only in low-health-low-
institutions countries, and not in high-health-high-institutions countries.  This matter 
will be investigated in the next two sub-sections.
88  
7.2 Tests of robustness 
The tests of robustness considered here are those of allowing for: (i) the 
possible endogeneity of the regressor, the risk of contracting malaria, in regression 
equations set out of Table 7.1, and (ii) the possible influence of outliers.  This latter 
test for robustness also provides one of the tests for the presence of the health-
cum-institutions poverty trap.  
7.2.1 Tests for the endogeneity of malaria 
As emphasized earlier in sub-Section 6.1, the lagged values for the 
regressors, mortality rates and institutions, were applied in the process of deriving 
the regression results presented in Table 7.1 in the attempt to mitigate the possible 
presence of endogeneity with respect to these two sets of regressors.  A lagged 
value for the risk of contracting malaria (or malaria risk) was not applied, however, 
for reasons explained in sub-Section 6.2.2.  Nevertheless, to allow for the 
possibility that this regressor is endogenously determined in the preferred 
                                  
88 The preferred regression equation estimates set out in Table 7.1, and in the tables that follow, 
could be exploited to estimate the influence that the level of health has, relative to that for the 
level of economic institutions, on the level of GDPPC in 1995.  This matter is touched upon in 
sub-Section 7.6 in the main text, although it is considered in more detail in Martina (2007).     75
regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1 this regression equation is re-estimated 
by applying a suitable instrumental variable (IV) for malaria risk within the context 
of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure.  In addition this method 
of estimation is used while applying, as before, the GTS methodology.  
In exploiting these estimation techniques, however, some care has to be 
taken in deciding on which IV to apply in order to reduce the risk of it being 
correlated with the error term in the relevant regression equation.  In addition this 
IV needs to be strong (or non-weak) enough in the sense that it is adequately 
correlated with the regressor, malaria risk, for which it is the instrument.  One IV for 
malaria risk that has been recommended by Kiszewski et al. (2004) is that devised 
in that reference.  The measure for this variable for a given region is an appropriate 
index of the ecology for this region.  It has been argued by Rodrik et al. (2004: 
151), however, that this IV is endogenously determined to some degree.  Rather 
than attempting to defend the use of this IV, an alternative IV is readily at hand and 
which is applied here; viz. the distance of the capital of a country from the equator 
– an IV that clearly is exogenous.   
This IV, however, is highly correlated with the dummy variable for the tropics 
– a statistically significant regressor to be found in the preferred regression 
equation number 4 in Table 7.1.
89  The resulting multicollinearity problem is likely 
to be aggravated, as indicated by the argument presented in Wooldridge (2003: 
502), by the use of 2SLS to estimate relevant regression equations.  To avoid this 
problem, and since malaria risk is a more informative variable (from the point of 
                                  
89 The simple correlation coefficient between the tropics and malaria risk is -0.8905.     76
view of designing effective public policy) than whether or not a country is located 
within the tropics, this latter regressor is omitted when re-estimating regression 
equation number 4 in Table 7.1. 
To provide a suitable point of comparison that regression equation is re-
estimated using the GTS methodology.  In doing so OLS is applied while the 
regressor, tropics, is replaced by the regressor distance from the equator.  The 
result is regression equation number 1 set out in Table 7.2.  This result implies - 
given that the GTS methodology has been employed - that the regressor, distance 
from the equator, is not statistically significant once other relevant regressors have 
been allowed for.   
Next regression equation 1 in Table 7.2 is re-estimated by applying the 
2SLS method of estimation along with the GTS methodology, where distance from 
the equator is the IV used for malaria risk.  The resulting regression equation is set 
out as regression equation number 2 in Table 7.2.
 90   
 
Table 7.2 comes about here 
 
To test if the IV used in deriving that regression equation is non-weak use is 
made of the test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005).  This test requires that if a 
                                  
90 In has been pointed out by Cartenson and Gundlach (2006: 313) that measures of geography are not acceptable 
IVs, to be employed in regression models of the form set out in (6.1) in the main text, if these measures have a 
direct influence the level of GDPPC.  However, as pointed out in the main text, in the process of deriving regression 
equation number 1 in Table 7.2 in the main text it was found that the regressor, distance from the equator, was not 
statically significant – that is after allowing for the presence of all other relevant regressors.  It follows that distance 
from the equator appears to be an acceptable IV to employ in deriving the 2SLS regression results reported in Table 
7.2.     77
particular instrument is sufficiently strongly identified with its regressor then the 
estimated F-statistic, for the first stage regression equation in the 2SLS estimation 
procedure, will need to exceed a certain critical value.  In the present context, 
where there is one assumed endogenous regressor and one IV, the value for this 
critical value is 16.38.  As can be seen in the instance of regression equation 
number 2 in Table 7.2, the associated F-statistic lies well above this critical value. 
As for the coefficient estimates in this regression equation (number 2), the 
regression coefficient for malaria risk is still statistically significant and has the 
expected sign.  It is emphasized, however, that this coefficient estimate has an 
absolute value significantly larger than that for this regressor in regression 
equation number 1 in Table 7.2.
 91  This result is contrary to what is to be expected 
if malaria risk is endogenously determined.  This observation suggests that the 
regressor, malaria risk, probably is not endogenously determined – just as was 
argued in sub-Section 6.2.2. – although malaria risk may now be capturing some of 
the influence of the omitted regressor, tropics.  Hence the coefficient estimate for 
the regressor, malaria risk, in regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1 probably 
is not biased – or at least not biased to a degree great enough to alter the 
argument being developed here. 
For the sake of completeness, however, the estimation of regression 
equation number 2 in Table 7.2 is extended through the process of gradually 
eliminating those regressors in that equation which are not statistically significant.  
This implies applying yet again the GTS methodology.  The end result is that set 
                                  
91 A similar situation arose in Batten and Martina (2007) where OLS and 2SLS regression results 
were compared.   78
out in regression equation number 3 in Table 7.2.  The F-statistic reported in that 
regression equation indicates that the IV being applied (distance from the equator) 
is still non-weak.  The coefficient estimate for the risk for contracting malaria is still 
statistically significant with the expected sign - and still significantly larger than that 
for the OLS estimate. 
The other core regressors - measuring economic institutions, the total 
mortality rate and the complementarity effect – remain statistically significant. 
7.2.2 Testing for outliers as a test of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  
As explained in Section 5, testing for outliers, in the data sets exploited to 
estimate the preferred regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1, provides the 
basis for one of the tests to determine if a health-cum-institutions poverty trap 
faces less well-off countries at the end of the 20
th century.
92  More specifically, the 
discussion at the end of sub-Section 5.1 indicated that one way to test if the health-
cum-institutions poverty trap exists, or not is to determine if the coefficient estimate 
for the complementarity effect remains statistically significant in regression 
equation number 4 in Table 7.1 once outliers have been allowed for.  If not then 
the economic theory (based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1) suggest that this is an 
indication that this complementarity effect probably is to be found in the (outlying) 
low-health-low-institutions countries.   
Regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1 is re-estimated using the 
quantile method where medium values are used to condition data sets.  This 
                                  
92 For a discussion of the importance of testing for outliers within the context of economic growth regression 
equations see Temple (2000).   79
implies that the least absolute deviation (LAD) model is being applied here in which 
extreme observations for any regressor are not given special weight (whereas 
these observations are if the OLS estimation method is applied). 
The quantile re-estimation of regression equation 4 in Table 7.1 is set out in 
Table 7.3.  The most striking aspect of this result is that the coefficient estimate for 
the regressor measuring the complementarity effect – viz. the inverse of the U5MR 
in about 1980 multiplied by the risk of repudiation for the early 1980s – now only 
has a t-statistic with a value of 0.49.  And this is so even though the values of the 
estimated t-statistics using the quantile regression method of estimation are likely 
to be overstated.
93  In contrast in the OLS estimate for this regression model the t-
statistic for the coefficient estimate for the complementarity effect is 2.21. 
 
Table 7.3 comes about here 
 
As explained in Section 5 these comparative results are not inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that a health-cum-institutions poverty trap exists.  These 
results imply, therefore, that the complementarity effect probably existed at the end 
of the 20
th century – although the evidence provided here is not especially strong.  
Hence a case can be made for including this complementarity effect in the 
preferred regression model set out in equation number 4 in Table 7.1 – even 
                                  
93 See Rogers (1992) and STATA (2005: 519 – 20) on this point.   80
though the coefficient estimate for this coefficient estimate is not statistically 
different from zero once the influence of outliers have been allowed for.   
The results set out in regression equation 1 in Table 7.3, when compared 
with those in regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1, also suggest that the 
coefficient estimates for the regressors, sub-Saharan Africa and Mining, suffer 
from the influence of outliers.  These are not surprising results.   
These various observations suggest, therefore, that the coefficient 
estimates in regression equation 1 in Table 7.3 may be reasonably satisfactory 
despite the fact some of these coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.  
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness regressors are eliminated from 
regression 1 in Table 7.3 one at a time according to the GTS methodology.  The 
end result is that set out as regression equation number 2 in Table 7.3.  In this 
regression equation the health regressors and the institution regressor are 
statistically significant and, therefore, do not appear to suffer from any problems 
associated with outliers.  What is more the size of the coefficient estimates for 
these regressors (estimated by applying the LAD method) approximate those to be 
found in regression equation number 4 in Table 7.1 (where the OLS method of 
estimation was applied).  
7.3 Further tests of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap  
In this sub-section more detailed tests are applied that require that the 
available data set is partitioned into appropriate sub-groups.  The theoretical ideas 
that underlie the tests to be applied were set out in Section 5.  As explained there 
these tests take the form of determining if the complementarity effect is present in   81
countries that have only attained comparatively low levels of health (and possibly 
low levels of institutions as well) and is absent in countries that have attained 
comparatively high levels of health (and presumably high levels of institutions as 
well).  During this exercise of testing if the health-cum-institutions poverty trap 
exists attention also is given to testing if the health-only poverty trap also exists 
amongst countries that have relatively extremely low level of health.  The structure 
of the relevant tests to be applied is set out in Section 5. 
Two measures of health are applied here - the risk of contracting malaria 
(for 1994) and the U5MR for the early 1980s – to guide the partitioning of countries 
into relevant groups.
94  For the former measure countries (non-malarious), for 
which there is no risk of contracting malaria, are considered as one group.   
Countries (malarious) for which there is some risk of contracting malaria are 
considered as the contrasting group.  In the instance of the U5MR, three 
benchmarks are applied.  The one is drawn at the level of 65 (deaths per thousand 
live births), another at the level of 50 and the third at 100.  Relevant countries are 
formed into groups based on the level of the U5MR for each country in a given 
group.  All the regression results to be reported for each relevant group are derived 
from the application, as before, of the GTS methodology.   
7.3.1 Malarious and non-malarious countries 
                                  
94 It might be argued that tree-regression techniques could be employed within the present context to identify 
high- and low-health countries respectively.  (These techniques have been employed by Tan (2005), for example, 
to analyze the structure of econometric growth models.) This econometric tool requires the assumption, however, 
that the form of the regression model is identical for each sub-group of countries – or identical for each branch of 
the regression tree.  The results discussed in the main text contradict this assumption.  Hence it seems 
inappropriate to employ this econometric technique within the present context.   82
On comparing the relevant empirical evidence for the malarious countries 
reported in Table 7.4 and the non-malarious countries reported in Table 7.5 it 
would appear that in the late 20
th century the conjectured health-cum-poverty trap 
faced only the malarious countries.  At least this conjecture is not contradicted by 
the evidence presented in these tables.  
  
Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 come about here. 
 
To explain, in regression equations numbered 1 and 2 in Table 7.4 are set 
out the most acceptable specific regression equations that could be generated by 
applying the GTS methodology.  In these regression equations the 
complementarity effect for the malarious countries is statistically significant at the 
five per cent level of significance.  In contrast, in the process of generating the 
most satisfactory specific regression equations that could be estimated for the non-
malarious countries the complementarity effect was always eliminated along the 
way towards estimating the specific regression equation.  The relevant specific 
regression equations are set out as regression equations numbered 1 and 3 in 
Table 7.5 – where the complementarity effect does not appear as a statistically 
significant regressor.  For completeness the complementarity effect was added to 
these two regression equations.  The regression results, as indicated in regression 
equations numbered 2 and 4 in that table, are that the coefficient estimates for the 
complementarity effect are both statistically insignificant.     83
It is also noted that the coefficient estimates in the regression equations 
numbered 1 and 2 in Table 7.4, and regression equations numbered 1 and 3 in 
Table 7.5 have the expected sign and are statistically significant (as required by 
the GTS methodology). 
The results reported in regression equations numbered 1 and 2 in Table 7.4 
also indicate that any suitable measure of institutions had no direct influence on 
the logarithm of GDPPC for the average malarious country at the end of the 20
th 
century.  Indeed all the various measures of institutions were individually 
eliminated along the way towards generating the specific regression model 
reported in that table.  To demonstrate this point, the size of the coefficient 
estimates and their associated t-statistics for each measure of institutions, just 
before this measure was eliminated from a general form of the relevant regression 
equation, are set out in columns 2 and 4 in Table 7.4.  Apparently, therefore, the 
only way that economic institutions influenced the level of the logarithm of GDPPC 
for the average malarious country at the end of the 20
th century was indirectly 
through the complementarity effect. 
This is not the situation to be found in the average non-malarious county.  
As can be seen in regression equations numbered 1 and 3 in Table 7.5, in this 
average country economic institutions have a direct positive influence on the level 
of the logarithm of GDPPC for this country.  
As for the various measures of health, they had a direct influence on the 
level of the logarithms of GDPPC for both the average malarious and the non-
malarious country at the end of the 20
th century.  The relevant measure of health in   84
the malarious country also had an indirect influence by operating through the 
complementarity effect.  (See regression equations numbered 1 and 2 in Table 7.4 
and regression equations numbered 1 and 3 in Table 7.5.)   
The main inference that can be drawn from these various observations is 
that the health-cum-institutions poverty trap appears to have operated in the 
malarious and not in non-malarious countries in the late 20
th century.  This result is 
broadly in line with what the theory of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap, 
based on Figures 3.1 and 4.1, suggests would be the situation.  
7.3.2 Comparing relatively low and high health countries 
For those countries that had an U5MR at or greater than 50, or 65 (deaths 
per thousand live births) the complementarity effect is present only if the TMR is 
not included as a regressor in the relevant regression equations.  Once the TMR is 
included as a regressor this variable appears to swamp the influence not only of 
the complementarity effect but also the influence of economic institutions as well.  
These statements are based on comparing the regression equations numbered 1 
and 2, and also comparing regression equations numbered 3 and 4 in Table 7.6.  
What is more regression equations numbered 2 and 4 are to be preferred to the 
other regression equations reported in Table 7.6 (since they have the smallest 
values for the Schwarz Criterion). 
 
Table 7.6 comes about here 
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Before commenting further on these results attention turns to consider 
regression equation number 1 set out in Table 7.7 for the group of countries with a 
U5MR at or less than 100.  The coefficient estimate for the complementarity effect 
now is statistically significant.  In contrast, however, for the countries with a U5MR 
at or less than 50 the complementarity effect is absent, as is indicated by 
regression equation number 2 in Table 7.7. 
 
  Table 7.7 comes about here. 
 
Combining these various observations (based on the results set out in 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7) it would appear that the complementarity effect only applies to 
a group of countries with a U5MR over the approximate range of 100 to 50 (deaths 
per thousand live births).  It is not possible, however, to determine this range for 
the U5MR with greater precision, by way of applying regression analysis, simply 
because the relevant data sets available would seem to be too small to provide 
adequately reliable estimates of relevant regression equations.   
As for the possible reason why the complementarity effect only operates 
over this approximate range, it would seem to be due to the fact that economic 
institutions do not influence the level of GDPPC for countries with a U5MR greater 
than about 100.  For this group of countries the level of health (as measured by the 
TMR) dominates completely in influencing the level of the logarithm of GDPPC for 
the countries concerned.  (This assertion is a clear implication of the results set out   86
in regression equations numbered 2 and 4 – the preferred regression equations - 
in Table 7.6.)  Economic institutions – specifically the Rule of Law or Repudiation - 
only begins to have some influence on the level of the logarithm of GDPPC for 
countries with a U5MR of about 100 or less.  (This is a clear implication of 
regression equations numbered 1 and 2 in Table 7.7 when compared with those 
set out in Table 7.6.)  By economic institutions beginning to have some influence, 
this facilitates health and economic institutions interacting with one another in the 
complementarity effect.   
These various inferences are now combined with the discussion, set out in 
Section 5.2 of the proposed tests of the health-only poverty trap and the health-
cum-institutions poverty trap respectively.  That discussion hypothesized that the 
health-only poverty trap applies only in a country that has an extremely low level of 
health – say a country with a U5MR of about 100 or more.  In these countries the 
level of economic institutions has no influence, and the level of health has some 
influence in determining the level of GDPPC for these extremely-low-health 
countries.  The earlier comments, made with respect to the empirical results set 
out in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 respectively, describe just such a situation applying in the 
average country for the group of countries with a U5MR of around 100 or more.  
Hence this average country appears to have faced the health-only poverty trap at 
the end of the 20
th century. 
The discussion in sub-Section 5.1 also indicated that in order to determine if 
the health-cum-institutions poverty trap is present it needs to be determined if the 
complementarity effect is present in countries with reasonably (but not extremely)   87
low levels of health and is absent in countries with comparatively high levels of 
health and institutions. Again the previous discussion (based on the empirical 
results set out in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 taken together) indicates that such a poverty 
trap faced the group of countries with an U5MR within the approximate range of 
100 to 50 at the end of the 20
th century.  Apparently it was absent in countries with 
a U5MR of less than 50 deaths per thousand live births.   
It is emphasized that these tests of the presence of these two forms of the 
poverty trap only applies to the average country for each relevant group of 
countries.   Within each group there may be countries that are exceptions to the 
average.  
7.4 Introducing additional information into the assessment 
The empirical results presented in the previous two sub-sections were 
derived by applying relatively small cross-country data sets.  Consequently the 
reported results, considered alone, probably are not that reliable.  These results 
become more cogent, however, once they are considered in conjunction with the 
mainly quasi-controlled experimental information presented in earlier sections.  Put 
differently, a more holistic approach is taken by assessing all the relevant 
information that is available.   
Considering first the results based on time-series data, as explained in 
Section 2 the various pieces of quasi-controlled experimental evidence presented 
there – particularly that with respect to the Panama Canal, Malaya, Northern 
Rhodesia and China – indicated that improving both the level of health and the 
level of institutions up to their respective threshold levels was a necessary   88
condition that needed to be satisfied before any marked increase in the rate of 
increase in the level of modern economic development was possible.  That quasi-
controlled experimental evidence – especially that for the Panama Canal and 
Malaya cases - also allows the inference to be drawn with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that if a low-health country is comparatively distant from attaining the 
threshold level of health – say the adult mortality rate is around 200 deaths per 
thousand or more - this low level of health would prevent this country from 
interacting with economic institutions no matter how high their quality.  These 
inferences, based on the quasi-controlled experimental evidence set out Section 2 
and which were developed in sub-Section 3.5, are not contradicted by the 
regression results presented earlier in the section – albeit results derived from 
limited cross-country data sets.  
The other relevant pieces of quasi-controlled experimental information were 
set out in Table 4.1 in sub-Section 4.3.2.2.  As emphasized there, in the instance 
of the four countries concerned (viz. China, Malaysia, South Korea and Vietnam) 
each experienced a marked improvement in the level of health, followed by a 
significant improvement in the quality of economic institutions that, soon after, was 
followed by a sharp improvement in the pace of economic development.
95  It is also 
noted that the U5MR in each of these countries declined such that it fell within the 
range 40 to 70 deaths (per thousand live births) before the subsequent 
improvement in the level of economic institutions and so on.  These observations 
                                  
95 As emphasized on sub-Section 4.3, the countries just listed in the main text were not just any four 
countries.  Towards the end of the 20
th, and into the 21
st century these four, and only a few other countries 
went from being comparatively poor to experiencing absolute convergence over a sustained period of time.  
Their respective economic experiences, therefore, provide a test of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap 
hypothesis.   89
suggest, therefore, that the complementarity effect is likely to have begun to come 
into operation in each of these countries when the U5MR was to be found within 
the relevant range and when the level of institutions had been raised to an 
adequate level.  These inferences equally are broadly consistent with the 
regression results presented earlier in this section.  
The information reported in the histograms set out in Charts 4.1 to 4.3, and 
the theory of the modified Solow-Swan growth also allowed the conjecture that the 
deep determinants of the level of health and economic institutions respectively in 
the early 1980s would be significant in explaining the bimodal distribution of 
GDPPC across countries at the end of the 20
th century.  Again the regression 
results reported earlier in this section are not inconsistent with this conjecture.   
Finally, the reasonable inference that can be drawn from these various 
pieces of evidence, when taken as a whole, is that the only countries that had 
managed to escape the health-cum-institutions poverty trap, or were in the process 
of escaping this poverty trap in the latter part of the 20
th  (and thereby were 
experiencing absolute convergence) were those with a U5MR below about 50 
deaths per 1000 live births and economic institutions that were of a comparatively 
good quality.
96  Those countries not fortunate enough to have attained these levels 
for these two deep determinants were faced with either the health-cum-institutions 
poverty trap or the poverty-only trap.  
7.5 Allowing for non-linearities and discontinuities 
                                  
96 Exactly what the level and form of economic institutions would need to be is not immediately 
obvious.  This matter is returned to at the end of the next section in the main text.   90
Referring back to the point made in sub-Section 5.3, one way of interpreting 
the various tests provided earlier in this section, of the possible existence of the 
health-cum-institutions and health-only poverty traps, is that they were directed at 
testing for the presence of the hypothesized non-linearities and discontinuities in 
the representative economy in which the fundamental constraint is presumed to be 
binding over a particular range of the capital/labor ratio.
97  The discontinuities take 
the form of the components present in the basic regression model (in which deep 
determinants influence the level of GDPPC for a country) varying over different 
levels of health.   
A natural additional inference that can be derived from the results derived 
from these various tests is that failure to allow adequately for these non-linearities 
and discontinuities in these tests would result in misleading or invalid inferences.  
To explain, in the regression results presented in Table 7.1, where the basic 
regression model is estimated by employing the full cross-country data set, non-
linearities are only partially allowed for.  No allowance is made for possible 
discontinuities.  Now if the testing of the relevant economic theory ceased at this 
point the results in Table 7.1 might be interpreted as indicating that the 
complementarity effect and economic institutions are of statistical significance in 
the economies for all countries - rich and poor and all in between.  The empirical 
results reported in sub-Section 7.3 suggest that this does not seem to be the case, 
however, once discontinuities explicitly are allowed for in the statistical analysis.  
                                  
97 In their testing for the existence of poverty traps Graham and Temple (2006) also allowed for the presence 
of non-linearities within the economic system.  The approach they took was quite different, however, to the line 
of enquiry explored in the main text.  Specifically, they employed a two sector model for a small economy.  
Constant returns apply to production in the agricultural sector and increasing returns apply in the non-
agricultural sector.  No mention is made of health and institutional considerations.     91
(As indicated in that sub-section, this is done by appropriately partitioning the 
cross-country data set, guided by the economic theory based on Figures 3.1 and 
4.1, and re-estimating regression models by applying the GTS methodology.)   
These general observations tend to confirm the general point made by 
Rodrìguez (2006); viz. that failure to allow adequately for non-linearities in cross-
country growth empirics results in biased and inconsistent estimates of relevant 
growth regression equations.
98  The previous discussion indicates that this point 
could be extended by also emphasizing the importance of allowing for possible 
discontinuities in economic systems. 
One further implication of the apparent discontinuities present in the 
economy for the representative economy, and which are represented to some 
extent in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, is that the standard neoclassical Solow-Swan growth 
model does not apply over all feasible values of the capital/labor ratio.  This model 
only applies within sub-sets of values for this ratio.  Within each sub-set the 
standard convergence process to a (local) steady state takes place.   
7.6 Relevant empirical results reported elsewhere  
The central theme that runs throughout the previous discussion is that the deep 
determinants of health and economic institutions both matter in influencing the ability of 
a poor country to surmount the fundamental constraint and then go on to experience 
sustained economic development.  The theory and the empirical evidence also 
indicated that the relative importance of these two deep determinants varies as an 
                                  
98 The study by Graham and Temple (2006) implicitly provides further confirmation of the point 
just made in the main text.   92
initially low-health poor country progresses up to the point of being placed in a position 
where it is capable of surmounting this constraint, and subsequently finding itself 
having surmounted this constraint.  In the initial early phase in the economic 
development process health appears to dominate completely.  Economic institutions 
become relatively more important as the country concerned begins to move into the 
region of being capable of surmounting the fundamental constraint and beyond.  In 
contrast health always plays a significant rôle in the economic development process.
99   
This perspective is at odds with a recent body of literature that, based on cross-
country evidence, concludes that of the two deep determinants, economic institutions is 
the only statistically significant deep determinant of long-term economic growth for the 
average country at the end of the 20
th century (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001, 2005), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).   
For instance Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005: 420 -1) state: 
  ‘[D]ifferences in economic institutions appear to be the robust causal factor 
underlying the differences in income per capita across countries.  Institutions are 
therefore the fundamental causes of income differences and long-run growth.’ 
Besides the empirical results presented earlier, there is a growing number of 
empirical studies, which draw on cross-country data sets, that come to a contrary 
conclusion; viz. both health and economic institutions have, or even only health has a 
statistically significant influence on the level of economic development for the average 
country at the end of the 20
th century (Sachs (2003), Lorentzen, McMillan and 
                                  
99 The relative importance of health and institutions respectively at the various stages in the process of economic 
development is discussed in some detail in Martina (2007).  Also see a related discussion in Batten and Martina 
(2007).   93
Wacziarg (2005), Presbitero (2006), Carstensen and Gundlach (2006), and Batten and 
Martina (2007)).
100   
These opposing sets of empirical results are considered in more detail in Martina 
(2007). 
7.7 Some apparent contradictory evidence? 
It has been noticed that the dispersions across all equally-weighted countries, for 
various measure of health (for instance life expectancy at birth and the U5MR) and 
economic institutions (such as constraints on chief executive power), all declined from 
about 1960 through to around 2000.
101  And yet, as noted in the introduction, over this 
same period non-rich countries had little success, in terms of GDPPC, in catching up 
with the rich countries.  In fact the standard deviation of the logarithm of GDPPC across 
all equally-weighted countries increased during this period.
102   
It might be suggested that these broad facts appear to contradict one another, 
given the theoretical and empirical arguments developed throughout the previous 
discussion.  Specifically, it possibly may be inferred from that discussion that the 
reductions in the dispersions, across all countries in the latter part of the 20
th century, 
for the just-cited deep determinants should have induced a significant reduction in the 
size of the standard deviation for the logarithm of GDPPC across all countries over that 
period.  (Grier and Grier (2007: 38), for instance, appear to come close to making this 
sort of inference.)  
                                  
100 A related study by Bleakley (2007) draws on cross-region and time-series data sets for the 
Southern United States for the first half of the 20
th Century.  
101 The dispersion for various measures of education also declined across all countries over the 
relevant period.  The relevant information is to be found in Ahmad et al. (2000), Kenny (2004) and Grier 
and Grier (2007).  
102 See Grier and Grier (2007).   94
  The empirically-tested theory presented in Sections 3 and 4 suggests a number 
of reasons, however, why this inference is likely to be invalid.  To begin to explain, 
suppose that the reduction in the dispersion of health across countries is only the result 
of a reduction, for instance, in the U5MR for countries at the upper tail of the distribution 
for this measure of health.  This change may only move the countries concerned nearer 
to, but not above the threshold for countries faced with the health-only poverty trap.  If a 
country is moved above this threshold, this is likely not to be enough to move this 
country to a position of being able to surmount the fundamental constraint - which is 
required to allow it to escape the health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  What is more, if, 
in a given non-rich country, the levels for both the deep determinants are below their 
respective threshold levels, increasing the level of only one of the deep determinants 
(health or institutions) above the threshold level in this country is likely not to be enough 
to allow this country to surmount the fundamental constraint (even if the amplification 
effect operate between health and institutions).  This is especially so if the improvement 
in relevant deep determinant begins at a relatively low level.  And until this country 
surmounts the fundamental constraint it is unlikely that this country will experience 
absolute convergence.   
  Nevertheless it is encouraging to observe the reductions in the dispersions, 
across all countries in the latter part of the 20
th century, for health and economic 
institutions.  Specifically, given the earlier discussion, these changes suggest that if 
these trends continue into the future then this will increase the probability that a 
relatively large number of non-rich countries will move into the situation where they will 
be capable of surmounting the fundamental constraint.  To assist this process, relevant   95
policies probably will need to be implemented in a certain sequence.  This matter is 
turned to next. 
 
8. The sequence in applying appropriate policy tools 
The previous discussion hints at a broad policy strategy that probably 
should be adopted in the attempt to assist an extremely-low-health poor country 
(that faces the health-only poverty trap) conquer the fundamental constraint.  A 
slightly different broad policy strategy should be adopted by a country that faces a 
health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  Specifically, that discussion suggests that an 
effective broad policy strategy requires that relevant policy tools should be applied 
in a particular sequence, and not just in any order. 
To begin to explain first it is assumed that those in authority in the country 
concerned wish to ensure that the economy for this country develops as rapidly as 
is feasible.  (This assumption may conflict with the reality to be found in certain 
countries in which the elite view economic development as undermining their 
privileged position.  See, for example, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) on this 
point.)  Having set this broad economic objective, and given that scarce resources 
need to be expended in order to raise the respective levels of health and economic 
institutions, attention should concentrate, initially, on raising the level of health in 
the extremely-low-health poor country.  Little effort should be devoted to raising the 
level of economic institutions.  If the objective is only to raise the level of the U5MR 
then the relevant broad components of what constitute an effective program to 
reduce this mortality rate in poor developing countries are reasonably well   96
understood.  Attention would need to concentrate on increasing: (i) the incidence of 
immunization against various contagious diseases, (ii) access to safe water and 
oral rehydration therapy, (iii) the availability of insecticide-treated bed nets in 
malarious countries
103 and (iv) the level of basic education especially for 
females.
104  What is more each of these expenditure programs, if they are to be 
implemented successfully, would require the presence of appropriate institutions 
concerned with the provision of public health and education.  In addition, as 
pointed out in sub-Section 3.4, a certain level of civil order will be required to allow 
these expenditure programs to be implemented effectively. 
Next assume that the U5MR in the representative country has fallen to be 
within the approximate range 100 to 50 deaths per thousand live births.  As a 
consequence this country probably has moved into the situation of being faced by 
the health-cum-institutions poverty trap.  In these circumstances now, and only 
now should significant efforts also be made to raise the level of economic 
institutions.  To achieve this end probably would require, amongst other things a 
significant rise in the level of basic and secondary education.  (This last 
observation follows from the discussion at the end of sub-Section 4.3.2.2.)   
Nevertheless, despite this shift in emphasis, and remembering the 
complementarity-amplification effect operating between health and economic 
institutions, efforts should continue to be made to raise the level of health.  If 
                                  
103 After searching the relevant medical literature, Jones et al. (2003: 69) conclude: ‘[A]bout two thirds of the child 
deaths could be prevented by interventions that are available today and are feasible in low-income countries at high 
levels of population coverage.’  And the cost of providing this medical intervention amounts to ‘… a few cent’s worth 
of [insecticide-treated materials for bed nets], oral rehydration therapy, or efforts to promote breastfeeding.’ (Jones 
et al., (2003, ibid.).) 
104 Besides the seminal work by Caldwell (1986), also see Case (2005: 272 - 273) on the importance of the 
provision of basic education for females for raising the level of health.     97
enough efforts are made on these two fronts then this country will be taken to a 
position where it should be able to surmount the fundamental constraint.
105
An implication of this broad policy recommendation is that, in the process of 
raising the average levels of health and education respectively, probably there also 
will need to be a reduction in the levels of inequality in the respective distributions 
of health and education across households in the representative poor country.  The 
reason is that this reduction in inequality should tend to reduce the costs of raising 
the average levels of health and education respectively up to the threshold 
levels.
106  It follows, given the central line of argument developed earlier, that this 
reduction in these types of inequality would tend to hasten the pace of economic 
development in the country concerned.  (These observations, if correct, also 
suggest yet another way in which the reduction in the level of inequality – in this 
                                  
105 The general matter of sequencing the application of relevant public policies in developing countries is also 
discussed within slightly different contexts in Batten and Martina (2007) and Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000).  
While the analysis provided by Ranis et al. is quite different to that developed in the main text, they do emphasize 
that for a poor country to experience sustained economic development it will need to raise the level of health and 
education before any concerted attempt is made to raise the rate of capital accumulation.  They do not consider, 
ho ever, the matter of economic institutions.  Also see Ranis and Stewart (2001) and Ranis (2004).   w
106 To explain the assertion just made in the main text assume, reasonably, that in the initial situation in the 
representative poor country health and education respectively are relatively unequally distributed across 
households.  In addition there is a group in the community (called Group A) that has already attained the 
threshold levels for health and education.  Next assume that the average levels of health and education are 
raised, without altering the distributions for these two variables, so that these average levels eventually reach 
the respective threshold levels.  This case is compared to the alternative where, while raising the average 
levels of health and education, inequalities are reduced to some degree.  The redistribution takes the form, 
say, of allocating additional expenditures on health and education only to households that are not in group A.  
(For the present incentive issues are ignored.)  Given that scare resources have to be expended on raising the 
levels of health and education, clearly the direct economic cost of achieving the required threshold levels 
would be greater in the former case (without redistribution) than in the latter case (with redistribution).  The 
introduction of incentive issues into this argument may complicate matters but the general line of argument just 
presented probably would still hold if realistic and reasonable policies were applied in the process of 
redistributing health and education across households while also raising the average levels for these two 
variables.   98
instance with respect to access to education and health respectively – in a non-rich 
country should tend to increase the level of economic efficiency in this country.
107)   
Currently it is not possible to provide an empirical testing of these 
distributional aspects of the broad policy strategies recommended here since, as 
far as I am aware, there is a dearth of information concerning the distribution of 
health and education across households in non-rich countries.  And even if such 
information were available, care would need to be taken in any relevant statistical 
analysis by allowing, bearing in mind the central argument presented in Banerjee 
and Duflo (2003), for the possible non-linear interactions between the distributions 
of health and education respectively and the rate of economic growth, or level of 
economic development across countries.   
Presuming that the broad policy strategies recommended here are 
appropriate for the representative extremely-low-health, and low-health-low-
institutions poor countries concerned, there still is a great deal of detail that 
needs to be added to this general policy framework. In the initial situation the 
precise appropriate institutional and technical components of an effective public 
health program probably would vary from community to community.
108  Similar 
remarks apply in the identification of the economic institutions that would need to 
be introduced and/or nurtured.  That this is so in indicated by the information set 
out in Table 4.1.  In the instance of the countries listed there – all of which, as 
                                  
107 Other examples, of how the reduction in the level of inequality in the distribution of resources in a 
community may increase the level of economic efficiency in this community, are to be found in Hoff (1996) 
and Ravallion (2006).  
108 An interesting brief discussion is provided by Epstein (2007: 43) of the importance, if effective public 
medical services are to be provided in any community, of maintaining accurate health statistics and precise 
records of medicines in stock and on order, salaries for staff and so on.   99
explained earlier, experienced significant amounts of absolute convergence - 
each made use of distinctly different sets of economic institutions.  What seems 
to have occurred is that various economic institutions evolved in order to suit the 
particular historical, cultural and economic circumstances to be found in the 
country concerned.  Nevertheless the particular set of institutional reforms 
employed in any one of these countries appears to have provided an adequate 
level of protection of individual and/or group property rights to facilitate 
comparatively rapid rates of economic development in the country concerned – 
given that this country probably was close to reaching, or had reached the 
threshold level of health.  (A more detailed discussion of these matters is 
provided by Rodrik (2005: 994 – 6, 1005 – 8; 2006: 979 – 980) and the 
references cited there.) 
 
9. Conclusions 
Based on the insights provided by quasi-controlled experimental evidence 
presented in Section 2, an attempt was made in Section 3 and into section 4 to 
develop a theory of the health-cum-institutions poverty trap and the health-only 
poverty trap.  A range of conjectures derived from this theory were tested in 
various ways.  It seems fair to say that these tests were consistent with one 
another in the sense that they all contributed to varying degrees towards 
supporting the hypothesis that the health-cum-institutions poverty trap faced low-
health, and probably low-institutions countries at the end of the 20
th century.   
Evidence also was presented that indicates that the health-only poverty trap most 
likely faced extremely-low-health countries at that time.  This set of observations   100
suggests that discontinuities exist in the development of the economy for the 
representative economy and, consequently, the standard neoclassical Solow-Swan 
economic growth model does not apply over feasible levels of the capital/labor 
ratio – only over subsets of this ratio.    
As indicated at the end of the previous section, this tested theory of how this 
economy functions at a deep or fundamental level has implications for the broad 
design of economic policy directed at effectively assisting poor countries to 
become more capable of experiencing comparatively rapid and sustained 
economic development.   
The range of evidence presented also provides, implicitly, a partial 
exposition of the mechanisms that cause persistent poverty to face certain 
countries and not in others and how, in broad terms, this poverty might best be 
mitigated.  As pointed out early in the introduction, these matters are of some 
importance given the gaps that exist in the relevant economic literature that 
address aspects of the broad topic of poverty.  
 
Appendix A 
The steps taken in the applying the general-to-specific methodology are as 
follows:  
(i)   Formulate an initial general unrestricted regression model drawing on: (a) 
relevant historical information, (b) the theory presented in Sections 2 
through to 6, (c) any additional relevant empirical information and (d) any 
other variables that have been emphasized in the relevant literature.    101
(ii)  This general unrestricted model, which includes 13 regressors, is estimated 
by applying ordinary least squares (OLS), or, if thought necessary, of using 
instrumental variables in a two-stage least square estimation procedure. 
(iii)    The regressor that has the coefficient estimate with the smallest 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistic is eliminated from the initial regression 
model.  (Where possible the robust t-statistics to be employed not only 
allows for heteroskedasticity but also the fact that the data sets being 
applied are of a finite size.
109) 
(iv)  The regression model is re-estimated and again the regressor with the 
smallest t-statistic is eliminated. 
(v)  This process is repeated until a stage is reached where each of the 
remaining regressors is statistically significant at least at the 5 per cent level 
according to the two-tail test. 
(vi)  To test for the robustness of the final specific regression model, in the latter 
stages of the estimation process, where no coefficient estimate has a t-
statistic less than 1.3, if there are two or more regressors with t-statistics 
within the range 1.3 to 1.8 then these regressors are removed in turn and 
the resulting regression models are re-estimated separately.  (For instance, 
if there are two such regressors then there are two regression models to be 
re-estimated.) 
                                  
109 See MacKinnon and White (1985), Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Long and Ervin (2000). 
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(vii)  If these regression models do not reduce to the same regression model 
then the Schwarz Criterion is applied to determine which regression model 
is to be preferred. 
(viii)  The process from (i) to (vii) is repeated with respect to each of the initial 
general unrestricted regression models that are specified. 
(ix)  The Schwarz Criterion is applied to determine which of the resulting final specific 
models is to be preferred above all the other specific models. 
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Chart 4.1 Distribution across countries of the Under-5 

































Chart 4.2: Distribution across countries of the Total 









































Chart 4.3: Distribution across countries  of the Risk of 

































  Time   Average growth  Average share of  Average under  Average population  Institutional  
  Period  rate of GDPPC  gross domestic  5 mortality rate  growth rate  Change 
    per annum (%)  savings of GDP (%)  per 1000 live  per annum (%)    
            births 
 
(People’s  1960 – 77    2.8       25.0      194 (1960-64)    2  End of Great Leap Forward  
Republic  of)                        and  Cultural  Revolution  pre- 
China  1979 – 88    8.7       35.0      50 (1980 - 84)    1.5  1978. Institutional reform 
                            begins in late 1978 and still 
  1989 – 2005    8.9       41.2      38 (1995 - 99)    1  in progress in early 21
st C.  
 
  1961 – 71    3.5       22      86 (1960 - 64)    3  Riots in 1969 
                  53  (1970  -  74) 
Malaysia  1972 – 84    6.0       28      26 (1980 - 84)    2.5  New Economic Policy 
                        announced  in  1971 
  1985 – 97    5.0       36      15 (1995 - 99)    2.5 
  
  1961 – 65    3.0       4.8      114 (1960 - 64)    3  Increased education  
 
(Republic of)  1966- 79    7.1       19.8      71 (1970 - 74)    2  facilitated subsequent   
Korea                         improvements in 
  1980 – 2005    7.0        24.7      12 (1995 - 99)    1  institutions from mid-1960s on 
 
 
  1985 – 91    2.8       5.5      74 (1970 – 74)    2  Institutional reform  
Vietnam                   65 (1980 - 84)      begins 1986 (Doi Moi 1986,  
                        Civil  Code  1995)  and  still 
  1992 – 2005    6.7       24      40 (1995 - 99)    1  in progress in early 21
st C. 
Source: Data on U5MR Ahmad et al. (2000).  Rest of data from World Bank (2006), World Development Indicators as of December 2006 
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Table 6.1 
 










Mean Std  Dev.  Min  Max. 
  1  Log  GDPPC
(PPP) 
Natural logarithm of PPP ($US)  
adjusted per capita GDP in 1995 
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2001) 
163 8.4384  1.0833  5.7714  10.4544 
Regressors utilizes in various forms of regression equation (6.1) in the main text 
 
  2  Malaria  Proportion of the  
population at risk of contracting malaria 
 in 1994 multiplied by an estimate of  
the proportion of the fraction of  
Plasmodium falciparum cases. 
Sources: Gallup and Sachs (2001) 
_ 
165 0.3608  0.4349  0  1 
  3  Children  





Number of deaths for children under the 
age of five years per thousand children  
live births.  Average for 1980 – 1989. 
Source: Ahmad, Lopez and Inoue (2000) 
158 101.693  83.3592  9  339 




Adult Male Mortality Rate (age 15 – 60). 
 Number of male deaths per thousand in 
 this age group.  Average for 1960 – 2000 
Source: Lorentzen et al. (2005) 
 
148 0.3129  0.1361  0.126  0.573 




Total Mortality Rate. 
Average for 1960 – 2000. 
Source: Lorentzen et al. (2005) 
 
145 0.0128  0.0055  0.005  0.029 
6  Rule of Law  
for early 1980s 
Measure of the soundness of  
political institutions. A rise in the index indicates 
 an increase in the level of the rule of  
law. Source: International Country  
Risk Guide (ICRG) Data, IRIS-3  
file. Average 1982 – 1985 
120 3.114  1.6167  1  6 
7 Repudiation 
for early 1980s 
Risk of Repudiation of contracts  
by government. Index 0 to 10. An increase 
 in index denotes a reduction in the risk 
 of repudiation. Source: International  
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data, IRIS-3  
file. Average 1982 – 1985 
120 5.6971  2.0507  2.1  10 
8 Expropriation 
for early 1980s  
Risk of expropriation of private investment.  
Index 0 to 10. An increase in   index denotes a 
 reduction in the risk of expropriation. Source:  
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 Data, IRIS-3 file.  Average 1982 – 1985. 
120 6.171  2.0716  1.99  10 
9 Some   
relevant 
institutions  
for early  
1980s  
multiplied by 
the inverse of  
some  
relevant 
mortality rate  
for early 1980s 
 
            110
10  Ease of access to
Water transport 
Proportion of the population 100 kms from a
navigable water way 
Source: Gallup et al. (1998) 
150 0.4321  0.3659  0  1 
11  Tropics  Proportion of country’s land area in tropical areas
Source: Gallup et al. (1999) 
144 0.5792  0.4718  0  1 
12  East  Asia  Dummy variable that takes of value of 1 if a
country belongs to East and  
South-east Asia and zero otherwise 
174 0.0805  0.2728  0  1 
13 Sub-Saharan 
Africa   
Dummy variable that takes of value of 1 if a
country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa  
and zero otherwise 
174 0.2770  0.4482  0  1 
14  Latin  America      Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a
country belongs to Latin America or 
 the Caribbean and zero otherwise 
174 0.1839  0.3885  0  1 
15  Mining  Proportion of GDP Produced in the  
Mining and Quarrying Sectors for about 1988 
Source: Hall and Jones (1999).  
Data found at 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/Halljones40
00.asc
128 0.5895  0.0925  0  0.533 
16  Ethnicity  Measure of the degree of ethnic diversity 
 Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
166 0.4452  0.2606  0  0.9392 
17  Language  Measure of linguistic diversity  
Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
163 0.4004  0.2838  0.0021  0.9227 
18  Log Openness  Natural logarithm of nominal openness  
to trade averaged over 1950 and  
1996. Source: Heston, Summers and  
Aten (2001). 
170 4.1240  0.5894  2.5534  5.7798 
19  Meantemp  Mean annual temperature (degrees Celsius) in
1987.   
Source: Gallup et al. (1998) and McArthur and
Sachs (2001). 
123 20.2276  7.3116  -0.2  29.3 
20  Ex-colony   Dummy variable that takes of value of 1  
if a country is an ex-colony and  
zero otherwise Author’s own calculations 
 
142  .788732      0.40965  0  1 
21   Distance from 
the equator 
Distance of the capital city for country from the 
equator. 
Gallup et al. (1998). 






















Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita Across Countries 
 
Dependent Variable 
Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995 
 
Regressors 
1 2 3  4 





Repudiation (early 1980s)    0.1401*** 
(3.60) 
  
Repudiation (early 1980s) 
Squared 
    0.0105*** 
(3.07) 
Expropriation (early 1980s) 
Squared 
     








Under-Five Child Mortality  






Under-Five Child  







Total Mortality Rate 
(approx. 1980) 





Total Mortality Rate  
(approx. 1980) Squared 





Inverse of Child Mortality  
Rate (approx 1980) multiplied  
by Repudiation (early 1980s) 
    0.6677* 
(2.21) 
Inverse of Child Mortality  
Rate (approx 1980) multiplied  
by Rule of Law (early 1980s) 
  1.6081*** 
(3.79) 
 




























Adjusted R squared  0.8690  0.8744  0.8983  0.9048 
Schwarz  Criterion  0.3406 0.0681 0.0516  0.0467 
Sample size  94  100  95  95 
In brackets are robust estimates of t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity given that the data  
sets are of finite size (MacKinnon and White (1985)). 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance. 
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Table 7.2 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita Across Countries: Allowing for the Possible Endogeneity 
of the Risk of Malaria in the Preferred Regression Model 
 
Dependent Variable 
Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995 




1 2 3 


























Total Mortality Rate  









Inverse of Child Mortality  
Rate (approx 1980) multiplied 

































Adjusted R Squared  0.8932  0.8809  0.8717 






Sample size  96  96  96 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance. 
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Table 7.3 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 




Log GDPPC 1995  Log GDPPC 1995 
 
 
Regressors  1 2 



















Total Mortality Rate  





Inverse of Child Mortality Rate  
(approx 1980) multiplied by  


















Pseudo R squared  0.7407  0.7066 
Sample size   95  100 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance. 
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Table 7.4 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita across Malarious Countries Only 
Dependent Variable 
Log GDPPC 1995  Log  
GDPPC 1995







 1   2 
  Coefficient estimates  
for alternative measures  
of Institutions used in  






Coefficient estimates  
for alternative measures  
of Institutions used in  




















        





Inverse of Total Mortalit
Rate (approx  
1980) multiplied by Rule  





















Adult Mortality Rate  
(approx. 1980) 
    -2.4673*** 
(-2.74) 
 
Malaria       -0.8424*** 
(-3.40) 
 
Inverse of Total  
Mortality Rate  
(approx 1980) multiplied  
by Repudiation  
(early 1980s) 
    0.0009* 
(2.25) 
Ease of access to  
water transport 
    0.3330* 
(2.31) 
 
Mining       2.6825*** 
(2.78) 
 
Adjusted R squared    0.7583    0.7576 
Schwarz Criterion    0.1490    0.1375 
Sample Size     61    54 
In brackets are robust estimates of t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity given that the data sets are of finite size 
(MacKinnon and White (1985)). 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance.   115
Table 7.5 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 
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to water transport 
















Inverse of  
Total Mortality  
rate (approx  
1980) multiplied  






Inverse of  
U5MR (approx  
1980) multiplied  
by Rule of Law  
(early 1980s) 
 
     0.8330 
(1.50) 
Adjusted R squared  0.8375  0.8374  0.8441  0.8492 
Schwarz Criterion  0.0561    0.0642   
Sample Size  39  39  41  41 
In brackets are robust estimates of t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity given that the data  
sets are of finite size (MacKinnon and White (1985)). 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance. 
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Table 7.6 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita across Countries with a U5MR of: (i) 65 or more 
and (ii) 50 or more 
 
Dependent Variable 
U5MR 65 or more 
 
U5MR 50 or more 










   
Total Mortality Rate 
(approx. 1980) 
   -325.1421*** 
(-7.45) 
 
Total Mortality Rate 
(approx. 1980) squared














































Latin  America     -0.3107*** 
(-2.69) 
 
Adjusted R squared  0.7555  0.8046  0.7508  0.8092 
Schwarz  Criterion  0.1373 0.0094 0.1337 0.0960 
Sample Size   54  64  57  69 
In brackets are robust estimates of t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity given that the data  
sets are of finite size (MacKinnon and White (1985)). 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
two-tailed test of significance. 
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Table 7.7 
 
Deep Determinants Influencing Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita across Countries with a U5MR of 100 or less 





U5MR 100 or less 
 
U5MR 50 or less 































Ex-colony   0.2051* 
(2.32) 
Inverse of U5MR
(approx 1980)  
multiplied by Rule  








Adjusted R squared  0.7695  0.8044 
Schwarz Criterion  0.1113  0.06562 
Sample Size   66  42 
In brackets are robust estimates of t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity given that the data  
sets are of finite size (MacKinnon and White (1985)). 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 2 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level according to the 
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